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Section	  1:	  Introduction	  Brazil	  will	  be	  the	  first	  country	  to	  host	  consecutively	  the	  two	  largest	  international	  sporting	  events:	  the	  World	  Cup	  in	  2014	  and	  the	  Rio	  de	  Janeiro	  Summer	  Olympics	  in	  2016.	  Since	  the	  first	  bid	  was	  awarded	  to	  Brazil	  in	  2007,	  hosting	  the	  games	  has	  provoked	  both	  excitement	  and	  criticism	  domestically.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  winning	  the	  bids	  seemed	  to	  cement	  the	  country’s	  position	  as	  a	  world	  power	  and	  economic	  player,	  and	  Brazilians	  showed	  their	  support	  by	  celebrating	  in	  the	  streets.	  But	  the	  games	  have	  also	  drawn	  public	  censure,	  as	  Brazil	  continues	  to	  grapple	  with	  poor	  social	  services,	  economic	  inequality,	  and	  urban	  blight—even	  as	  dips	  into	  public	  coffers	  to	  invest	  in	  lavish	  new	  stadia.	  In	  June	  2013,	  thousands	  of	  Brazilians	  took	  to	  the	  streets	  to	  protest	  a	  raise	  in	  bus	  fares.	  But	  this	  action	  was	  more	  than	  a	  demonstration	  against	  higher	  transportation	  costs;	  rather,	  citizens	  were	  objecting	  to	  the	  duplicity	  of	  a	  government	  eager	  to	  spend	  billions	  for	  sporting	  events	  while	  neglecting	  its	  most	  basic	  public	  policy	  obligations.	  If	  Brazil	  already	  faced	  daunting	  tasks	  in	  improving	  its	  public	  programs	  and	  increasing	  development,	  why	  did	  it	  eagerly	  vie	  to	  take	  on	  the	  additional	  burdens	  of	  hosting	  the	  two	  largest	  sporting	  events	  in	  the	  world?	  A	  review	  of	  the	  promises	  made	  by	  organizing	  committees	  and	  governments,	  as	  well	  as	  theoretical	  economic	  and	  sociological	  explanations,	  illuminates	  why,	  in	  general,	  countries	  compete	  for	  sport	  mega-­‐events	  despite	  their	  high	  costs,	  and	  why	  Brazil	  in	  particular	  bade	  to	  host	  these	  mega-­‐events.	  I	  argue	  that	  Brazil’s	  justifications	  for	  hosting	  follow	  three	  general	  rationales:	  first,	  countries	  consistently	  claim	  that	  these	  events	  will	  increase	  employment	  opportunities	  and	  foreign	  investment,	  boosting	  the	  overall	  economy.	  Secondly,	  they	  declare	  that	  hosting	  a	  mega-­‐event	  provides	  an	  impetus	  to	  construct	  necessary	  infrastructure	  and	  improve	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transportation—projects	  that	  will	  be	  useful	  to	  residents	  long	  past	  the	  event.	  And	  third,	  they	  assert	  that	  their	  citizens	  value	  certain	  intangible	  aspects	  of	  hosting	  these	  events—for	  example,	  the	  status	  afforded	  by	  joining	  an	  elite	  group	  of	  Olympic	  cities,	  feelings	  of	  national	  unity	  inspired	  by	  communal	  spectacle,	  and	  for	  Brazil	  specifically,	  the	  pride	  of	  hosting	  the	  flagship	  soccer	  event	  in	  the	  home	  of	  jogo	  bonito—the	  “beautiful	  game.”	  In	  this	  paper,	  I	  focus	  on	  evaluating	  the	  third	  claim:	  that	  Brazilians	  value	  the	  abstract	  benefits	  of	  hosting	  mega-­‐events.	  Underlying	  this	  analysis	  is	  the	  notion	  that	  the	  perceived	  benefits	  must	  justify	  the	  opportunity	  cost	  of	  public	  spending	  on	  mega-­‐events	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  other	  projects.	  I	  first	  present	  the	  increasingly	  popular	  trend	  of	  bidding	  to	  host	  mega-­‐events,	  and	  outline	  the	  theoretical	  explanations	  for	  this	  phenomenon.	  I	  then	  examine	  several	  case	  studies	  of	  countries	  and	  cities	  that	  hosted	  the	  World	  Cup	  and	  Olympics,	  and	  evaluate	  how	  they	  fulfilled	  the	  three	  promises	  of	  event	  hosting	  (economic,	  infrastructural,	  and	  intangible	  benefits).	  I	  show	  that	  nearly	  every	  host	  nation	  has	  underestimated	  the	  costs	  and	  overestimated	  the	  benefits	  of	  hosting	  and	  most	  have	  failed	  to	  spur	  necessary	  infrastructure	  projects.	  It	  is	  less	  apparent	  whether	  or	  not	  citizens	  indeed	  experience	  a	  feel-­‐good	  effect	  from	  their	  country	  hosting	  a	  mega-­‐event,	  so	  these	  intangible	  benefits	  are	  the	  linchpin	  that	  may	  effectively	  determine	  the	  event’s	  value.	  The	  cost-­‐benefit	  analysis	  is	  somewhat	  different	  for	  developing	  countries,	  however,	  and	  I	  discuss	  the	  unique	  challenges	  and	  opportunities	  that	  those	  nations	  face	  in	  hosting	  mega-­‐events.	  	  The	  theoretical	  explanations	  and	  historical	  experiences,	  together	  with	  background	  information	  about	  Brazil,	  allow	  me	  to	  propose	  a	  set	  of	  expectations	  for	  how	  it	  will	  fare	  hosting	  the	  2014	  World	  Cup	  and	  2016	  Olympics.	  An	  overview	  of	  Brazil’s	  preparations	  thus	  far	  supports	  my	  hypothesis	  that	  Brazil	  will	  experience	  neither	  an	  economic	  windfall	  nor	  an	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infrastructural	  legacy	  from	  hosting.	  Lastly,	  I	  address	  the	  claim	  that	  Brazilian	  citizens	  value	  the	  intangible	  benefits	  highly	  enough	  to	  singlehandedly	  make	  hosting	  these	  events	  worthwhile.	  Original	  survey	  data	  and	  an	  analysis	  of	  views	  published	  in	  a	  Brazilian	  newspaper’s	  letters	  to	  the	  editor	  support	  my	  hypothesis	  that	  Brazilians	  generally	  do	  not	  value	  hosting	  the	  World	  Cup	  and	  Olympics	  while	  more	  pressing	  social	  concerns	  remain	  unaddressed.	  Indeed,	  mega-­‐events’	  notoriously	  opaque	  and	  corrupt	  bidding	  processes	  allow	  boosters1—business	  interests	  and	  politicians	  with	  the	  most	  to	  gain	  from	  hosting—to	  claim	  broad	  domestic	  support	  while	  forgoing	  any	  real	  democratic	  input.	  In	  this	  context,	  it	  seems	  plausible	  that	  Brazilian	  boosters	  overstated	  the	  domestic	  support	  for	  hosting	  these	  mega-­‐events	  in	  order	  to	  reap	  the	  benefits	  themselves.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Boyle	  (1999)	  defines	  boosters	  as	  local	  entrepreneurs	  seeking	  to	  market	  a	  site	  in	  order	  to	  attract	  global	  capital	  (p.	  68).	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Section	  2:	  Historical	  context	  and	  theoretical	  explanations	  
	   In	  recent	  years,	  hosting	  the	  World	  Cup	  or	  Olympics	  has	  become	  a	  desired	  prize,	  not	  just	  among	  wealthy	  countries	  but	  also	  among	  developing	  ones.	  The	  perceived	  value	  of	  event	  hosting	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  increased	  competition	  among	  cities	  or	  countries	  to	  host,	  especially	  for	  the	  Summer	  Olympics:	  whereas	  only	  one	  candidate	  bid	  to	  host	  the	  1984	  Olympics,	  a	  high	  of	  11	  competitors	  bade	  for	  them	  in	  2004.	  Rio	  de	  Janeiro	  defeated	  six	  other	  candidates	  to	  host	  the	  2016	  Olympic	  Games.	  Figure	  1	  shows	  the	  trend	  of	  increasing	  country	  competition	  to	  host	  the	  Olympics,	  overall	  and	  among	  developing	  countries	  (defined	  here	  as	  non-­‐members	  of	  the	  Organisation	  for	  Economic	  Co-­‐Operation	  and	  Development,	  or	  OECD).	  Non-­‐OECD	  countries	  have	  submitted	  more	  bids	  roughly	  proportionally	  to	  the	  total	  bids.	  
Figure	  1:	  Bids	  per	  Summer	  Olympic	  Games,	  1972-­‐2016	  








1972	  1976	  1980	  1984	  1988	  1992	  1996	  2000	  2004	  2008	  2012	  2016	  
Total	  number	  of	  bids	  
Number	  of	  bids	  from	  non-­‐OECD	  countries	  Linear	  (Total	  number	  of	  bids)	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The	  frenzy	  for	  hosting	  mega-­‐events	  baffles	  scholars,	  most	  of	  who	  agree	  that	  the	  economic	  costs	  generally	  outweigh	  the	  benefits.	  At	  a	  bare	  minimum,	  hosting	  these	  events	  requires	  unavoidable	  and	  costly	  preparations	  to	  abide	  by	  Fédération	  Internationale	  de	  Football	  Association	  (FIFA)	  and	  the	  International	  Olympic	  Committee’s	  (IOC)	  stringent	  guidelines	  for	  stadia	  construction,	  safety	  mechanisms	  and	  athlete	  lodging	  (Baade	  &	  Matheson,	  2004).	  Owen	  (2005)	  shows	  that	  in	  practice,	  ex-­‐ante	  economic	  impact	  studies	  consistently	  underestimate	  these	  costs	  and	  exaggerate	  the	  benefits	  of	  hosting.	  Organizing	  committees	  can	  publish	  modest	  cost	  estimates	  because	  accounting	  loopholes	  allow	  them	  to	  record	  only	  operating	  costs	  while	  omitting	  capital	  costs,	  which	  tend	  to	  be	  much	  larger	  (Zimbalist,	  2011).	  The	  competitive	  auction	  format	  (one	  seller	  and	  multiple	  potential	  buyers)	  incentivizes	  boosters	  to	  increase	  their	  bids’	  promises	  beyond	  a	  reasonable	  level	  that	  might	  have	  produced	  a	  net	  benefit	  for	  locals	  (Zimbalist,	  2013).	  Others	  argue	  that	  countries	  and	  cities	  produce	  misleading	  ex	  ante	  economic	  impact	  studies	  because	  they	  are	  often	  conducted	  by	  the	  boosters,	  who	  are	  biased	  in	  favor	  of	  hosting	  (Barclay,	  2009),	  and	  that	  those	  studies	  may	  be	  intentionally	  deceptive	  (Horne,	  2006).	  Baade	  and	  Matheson	  	  (2003)	  warn	  that	  unless	  Olympic	  costs	  are	  accompanied	  by	  long-­‐term	  infrastructural	  investments,	  the	  games	  amount	  to	  a	  “fool’s	  gold”	  for	  the	  host	  city	  (p.	  1).	  The	  economic	  boost	  from	  mega-­‐events	  appears	  negligible	  even	  in	  the	  short-­‐term:	  higher	  prices	  and	  slight	  dips	  in	  unemployment	  eclipse	  any	  stimulus	  to	  industries	  like	  tourism	  and	  telecommunications	  (Bohlmann	  &	  Van	  Heerden,	  2008).	  Economic	  benefits	  also	  tend	  to	  accrue	  to	  foreign	  companies,	  as	  well	  as	  FIFA	  and	  the	  IOC	  (which	  demand	  a	  high	  proportion	  of	  the	  revenues),	  leaving	  only	  a	  fraction	  for	  local	  residents.	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   Just	  as	  organizing	  committees	  and	  boosters	  consistently	  inflate	  their	  projections	  of	  economic	  windfall,	  they	  also	  tend	  to	  be	  overly	  optimistic	  about	  stimulating	  infrastructure	  projects	  that	  will	  prove	  useful	  to	  residents	  even	  after	  the	  event.	  Scholars	  distinguish	  practical	  infrastructural	  outcomes,	  like	  transportation	  improvements,	  from	  structures	  that	  will	  only	  be	  used	  in	  the	  short	  term.	  Zimbalist	  (2011)	  captures	  economists’	  concern	  about	  constructing	  “white	  elephants,”	  which	  he	  defines	  as	  “facilities	  built	  especially	  for	  the	  Games	  [that]	  go	  un-­‐	  or	  underutilized	  after	  …	  while	  requiring	  tens	  of	  millions	  of	  dollars	  annually	  to	  maintain	  and	  occupying	  increasingly	  scarce	  real	  estate”	  (2011,	  p.	  121).	  Scholars	  claim	  that	  investing	  in	  long-­‐term	  development	  projects	  may	  be	  the	  key	  to	  justifying	  the	  costs.	  They	  praise	  the	  1992	  Barcelona	  Olympics	  as	  a	  rare	  success	  story	  of	  maximizing	  long-­‐run	  public	  benefits	  while	  minimizing	  short	  run	  costs.	  By	  investing	  in	  urban	  development,	  environmental	  restoration,	  and	  civil	  construction	  projects,	  Barcelona	  transformed	  itself	  into	  a	  tourist	  and	  business	  destination	  and	  continued	  to	  reap	  benefits	  after	  the	  events	  passed	  (Brunet,	  2005).	  Similarly,	  Zhang	  and	  Zhao	  (2007)	  found	  that	  the	  2008	  Beijing	  Olympics	  prompted	  China	  to	  pursue	  construction	  projects	  even	  outside	  the	  host	  city.	  	  However,	  other	  countries	  become	  laden	  with	  practically	  useless	  structures	  requiring	  expensive	  upkeep	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  hosting	  a	  mega-­‐event.	  Arenas	  are	  especially	  likely	  to	  become	  white	  elephants	  if	  their	  intended	  use	  does	  not	  fit	  with	  local	  tradition;	  for	  example,	  South	  Korea	  never	  had	  an	  entrenched	  soccer	  culture,	  so	  it	  used	  the	  ten	  new	  stadia	  it	  built	  for	  the	  2002	  World	  Cup	  for	  musical	  events	  after	  the	  games,	  substantially	  under	  capacity	  (Matheson	  &	  Baade,	  2004,	  p.	  15).	  If	  structures	  are	  built	  without	  considering	  future	  use,	  they	  risk	  draining	  local	  resources	  rather	  than	  contributing	  to	  them.	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Section	  3:	  General	  rationales	  for	  hosting:	  host	  experiences	  
Economic	  boost	  	   	  Empirically,	  most	  mega-­‐events	  have	  exceeded	  their	  original	  budgets	  and	  delivered	  less	  of	  an	  economic	  boost	  than	  anticipated,	  if	  any	  at	  all.	  Flyvbjerg	  and	  Stewart	  (2012)	  analyzed	  the	  costs	  of	  all	  summer	  and	  winter	  Olympic	  Games	  from	  1960-­‐2012	  and	  found	  that	  every	  single	  one	  overran	  costs,	  by	  an	  average	  size	  of	  179%	  (para.	  3).	  I	  will	  show	  the	  economic	  results	  by	  examining	  cost	  overruns	  and	  economic	  indicators	  among	  a	  sample	  of	  five	  events:	  the	  1984	  Los	  Angeles	  Olympics,	  2002	  South	  Korea	  /	  Japan	  World	  Cup,	  2004	  Athens	  Olympics,	  2008	  Beijing	  Olympics,	  and	  2010	  South	  Africa	  World	  Cup.	  China	  and	  South	  Africa	  merit	  analysis	  because	  they	  resemble	  Brazil	  in	  development	  levels,	  whereas	  South	  Korea	  and	  Japan	  are	  similar	  to	  Brazil	  in	  the	  size	  of	  its	  economy.	  I	  include	  the	  Athens	  Olympics	  as	  an	  example	  of	  overspending,	  and	  the	  Los	  Angeles	  games	  as	  a	  financial	  success.	  Table	  1	  shows	  that	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  Los	  Angeles,	  which	  came	  in	  under	  budget	  and	  made	  a	  small	  profit,	  each	  case	  spent	  more	  than	  its	  original	  bid	  stated.	  The	  size	  of	  the	  cost	  overruns,	  however,	  should	  be	  viewed	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  size	  of	  the	  host	  country’s	  economy:	  Athens’	  overspending	  alone	  amounted	  to	  2.5%	  of	  its	  GDP	  in	  2004	  (leading	  some	  to	  blame	  the	  Olympics	  for	  contributing	  to	  its	  later	  debt	  crisis),	  while	  China’s	  much	  larger	  economy	  softened	  the	  blow	  of	  its	  massive	  overspending	  (0.4%	  of	  GDP)	  (World	  Bank).	  
Table	  1:	  Predicted	  and	  actual	  costs	  by	  country	  (billions	  of	  USD)	  Event	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  Predicted	  	   	  	  	  	  	  Actual	  	   	  	  	  	  Size	  of	  Loss2	  	  	  	  	  	   Cost	  Overrun	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Cost	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Cost	   	   	   	   	  as	  %	  of	  GDP	  1984	  Los	  Angeles	  Olympics	   0.448	   0.413	   -­‐0.035	   0.0009	  2002	  South	  Korea	  /	  Japan	  World	  Cup	   1.3	   6	   +4.7	   0.1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Calculated	  as	  actual	  –	  predicted	  cost.	  A	  negative	  difference	  (Los	  Angeles	  1984)	  indicates	  the	  event	  came	  in	  under	  budget,	  saving	  money.	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2004	  Athens	  Olympics	   6	   11.6	   +5.6	   2.5	  2008	  Beijing	  Olympics	   24.6	   42	   +17.4	   0.4	  2010	  South	  Africa	  	  World	  Cup	   0.3	   4	   +3.7	   1.0	  Sources:	  LA84	  Foundation,	  2013;	  Dwinger,	  2010;	  Fowler	  &	  Meichtry,	  2008;	  Gatopoulos,	  2010;	  Goldblatt,	  2010;	  World	  Bank,	  2012	  	  	   As	  experts	  expect,	  the	  data	  for	  these	  countries	  in	  the	  years	  prior	  to	  and	  after	  hosting	  do	  not	  show	  that	  it	  triggers	  an	  economic	  bounce,	  according	  to	  World	  Bank	  metrics.	  GDP	  growth	  rates	  and	  unemployment,	  two	  of	  the	  main	  components	  of	  event-­‐related	  economic	  promises,	  seem	  not	  to	  be	  affected	  by	  the	  events.	  Japan	  and	  South	  Korea’s	  patterns	  of	  growth	  since	  2003	  have	  remained	  consistent	  with	  the	  world	  average.	  China	  experienced	  less	  GDP	  contraction	  than	  the	  world	  average	  in	  2008,	  but	  also	  rebounded	  less	  forcefully	  in	  2009.	  Greece’s	  GDP	  growth	  has	  plummeted	  since	  hosting	  in	  2004,	  though	  that	  is	  likely	  due	  to	  its	  debt	  crisis,	  which	  was	  not	  caused	  entirely	  by	  hosting	  the	  Olympics.	  South	  Africa’s	  GDP	  grew	  at	  3%	  in	  the	  year	  it	  hosted	  the	  World	  Cup,	  one	  percentage	  point	  behind	  the	  world	  average	  of	  4%	  growth.	  The	  United	  States’	  GDP	  grew	  faster	  than	  the	  world	  average	  when	  it	  hosted	  the	  1984	  Olympics	  (7%	  vs.	  5%),	  but	  that	  was	  true	  the	  year	  before	  as	  well,	  and	  the	  trend	  stopped	  the	  following	  year;	  the	  Los	  Angeles	  Games	  probably	  had	  little	  to	  do	  with	  this	  one	  way	  or	  another	  since	  spending	  constituted	  only	  0.01%	  of	  the	  national	  GDP	  in	  that	  year,	  using	  current	  USD	  (World	  Bank,	  2012).	  It	  is	  impossible	  to	  isolate	  the	  games’	  direct	  effect	  on	  the	  respective	  country’s	  economy,	  but	  these	  data	  do	  not	  support	  boosters’	  lofty	  claims	  that	  the	  Olympics	  or	  World	  Cup	  are	  economic	  bonanzas.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  they	  also	  do	  not	  show	  that	  hosting	  had	  disastrous	  economic	  consequences	  (except	  for	  Greece),	  as	  some	  fear.	  Figure	  2	  charts	  countries’	  GDP	  growth	  against	  the	  world	  average	  from	  2003-­‐2012.	  	  
Figure	  2:	  GDP	  growth	  (annual	  %)	  among	  case	  countries34	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  United	  States	  not	  included	  because	  World	  Bank	  graphics	  do	  not	  go	  back	  to	  1984.	  	  4	  Blue	  circles	  in	  figures	  2,	  3	  and	  4	  indicate	  the	  year	  that	  country	  hosted	  its	  respective	  event.	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(World	  Bank,	  2012)	  	   The	  empirical	  data	  also	  does	  not	  support	  the	  theory	  that	  hosting	  mega-­‐events	  improves	  economic	  development,	  as	  measured	  by	  rates	  of	  employment	  and	  foreign	  direct	  investment	  (FDI)	  inflow.	  South	  Africa	  was	  the	  only	  country	  that	  experience	  a	  noticeable	  increase	  in	  employment	  rates	  from	  2003-­‐2011,	  but	  it	  peaked	  in	  2008,	  before	  the	  events,	  and	  actually	  matched	  2005	  levels	  in	  the	  year	  it	  hosted	  the	  World	  Cup,	  suggesting	  that	  the	  events	  had	  no	  impact	  on	  employment	  (Figure	  3).	  The	  data	  paint	  a	  more	  complicated	  picture	  of	  FDI	  patterns	  as	  measured	  by	  net	  investment	  inflows	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	  GDP.	  Still,	  China	  and	  South	  Africa	  –	  arguably	  the	  two	  countries	  with	  the	  most	  to	  gain	  from	  an	  improved	  international	  business	  reputation	  –	  actually	  saw	  decreased	  FDI	  in	  the	  two	  years	  leading	  up	  to	  their	  respective	  events,	  and	  although	  both	  have	  rebounded	  since,	  neither	  have	  reached	  levels	  of	  investment	  they	  enjoyed	  prior	  to	  hosting	  (Figure	  4).	  Again,	  none	  of	  these	  data	  conclusively	  prove	  that	  hosting	  mega-­‐events	  causes	  economic	  harm,	  or	  denies	  the	  possibility	  of	  some	  economic	  boost;	  rather,	  it	  seems	  that	  the	  magnitude	  of	  economic	  benefits	  is	  extremely	  modest	  compared	  with	  projections.	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  Source:	   World	  Bank,	  2011	  	  	  	  
Figure	  4:	  Net	  inflows	  of	  FDI	  among	  Case	  Countries	  (%	  of	  GDP)	  
(World	  Bank,	  2011)	  	  
Figure	  4:	  Net	  inflows	  of	  FDI	  among	  case	  countries	  (%	  of	  GDP)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (World	  Bank,	  2012)	  Despite	  the	  reasons	  for	  skepticism	  about	  most	  claims	  of	  economic	  improvements,	  Rose	  and	  Spiegel	  (2011)	  contend	  that	  bidding	  for	  the	  Olympics	  increases	  a	  country’s	  trade	  exports.	  They	  found	  that	  cities	  that	  bade	  for	  the	  Olympics	  from	  1960-­‐2006	  experienced	  a	  positive,	  substantial	  export	  effect	  from	  hosting.	  They	  attribute	  the	  increases	  to	  a	  strategy	  of	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signaling	  trade	  liberalization	  to	  international	  investors.	  By	  their	  estimation,	  the	  high	  costs	  of	  hosting	  are	  in	  fact	  essential	  to	  their	  signaling	  power:	  only	  countries	  that	  “sincerely	  intend	  to	  pursue	  liberalization”	  will	  pay	  the	  high	  costs	  of	  sending	  that	  signal	  through	  bidding	  for	  an	  expensive	  event	  (p.	  655).	  In	  this	  way,	  competing	  to	  host	  the	  event	  serves	  as	  a	  mechanism	  to	  identify	  countries	  that	  are	  serious	  about	  opening	  themselves	  to	  the	  global	  economy.	  Controlling	  for	  other	  variables,	  Rose	  and	  Spiegel	  estimate	  that	  countries	  that	  have	  hosted	  the	  Olympics	  export	  20%	  more	  (p.	  659).	  However,	  they	  note	  that	  countries	  that	  bid	  unsuccessfully	  for	  the	  event	  also	  experienced	  the	  export	  benefits.	  They	  determine	  that	  countries	  can	  signal	  economic	  openness	  merely	  by	  competing	  to	  host	  the	  events;	  the	  experience	  of	  actually	  hosting,	  while	  costly,	  does	  not	  add	  much	  more.	  	  
Infrastructural	  legacy	  
	   Among	  the	  lofty	  justifications	  that	  countries	  tout	  for	  bidding	  for	  the	  World	  Cup	  and	  Olympics	  is	  that	  they	  will	  spur	  the	  construction	  of	  necessary	  public	  works.	  Building	  and	  renovating	  infrastructure	  typically	  constitutes	  the	  largest	  cost	  of	  hosting	  the	  World	  Cup	  and	  Olympics,	  and	  almost	  always	  entails	  public	  subsidies	  (Baade,	  2006,	  p.	  177).	  The	  validity	  of	  that	  claim,	  however,	  hinges	  upon	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  capital	  investment:	  scholars	  agree	  that	  spending	  on	  infrastructure	  is	  only	  worthwhile	  when	  it	  stands	  to	  be	  useful	  after	  the	  games	  (Owen,	  2005).	  The	  undesirable	  alternative	  is	  pouring	  public	  money	  into	  expensive	  white	  elephants,	  like	  single-­‐purpose	  stadia	  that	  will	  be	  underutilized	  after	  the	  events.	  Hosts	  may	  seize	  or	  squander	  the	  opportunities	  afforded	  by	  mega-­‐events	  according	  to	  how	  they	  balance	  long-­‐term	  urban	  planning	  goals	  with	  short-­‐term	  facility	  requirements.	  	  	   Building	  even	  the	  bare	  minimum	  of	  infrastructure	  necessary	  to	  support	  the	  games	  nonetheless	  requires	  substantial	  investments.	  Many	  of	  the	  costs,	  like	  venues	  for	  matches,	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accommodations	  for	  athletes	  and	  the	  media,	  and	  telecommunications	  infrastructure,	  are	  unavoidable.	  FIFA	  requires	  that	  the	  host	  country	  have	  from	  eight	  to	  ten	  modern	  stadiums	  with	  40,000-­‐60,000	  seats	  apiece	  (Barclay,	  2009,	  p.	  62),	  though	  they	  recommend	  that	  hosts	  have	  at	  least	  one	  stadium	  that	  can	  seat	  80,000	  (FIFA).	  In	  addition,	  FIFA	  has	  strict	  specifications	  for	  stadium	  parking,	  media	  accommodations,	  disability	  access,	  lighting,	  and	  more.	  As	  a	  result,	  organizing	  committees	  must	  invest	  in	  new	  stadia	  or	  refurbish	  old	  ones	  to	  fit	  these	  requirements.	  The	  IOC	  also	  makes	  high	  demands	  of	  host	  cities,	  requiring	  an	  Olympic	  Village	  with	  capacity	  of	  15,000,	  more	  than	  42,000	  hotel	  beds	  for	  visitors,	  and	  specialized	  athletic	  venues	  to	  accommodate	  events	  for	  each	  sport	  (Preuss,	  2004,	  p.	  61).	  	  	   Some	  countries	  do	  manage	  to	  invest	  wisely	  in	  infrastructure	  projects,	  resulting	  in	  long-­‐lasting	  legacies	  for	  citizens.	  Scholars	  hail	  Barcelona	  for	  managing	  the	  1992	  Olympics	  with	  an	  eye	  towards	  future	  gains.	  Brunet	  (2005)	  credits	  Barcelona	  with	  keeping	  operating	  costs	  low	  and	  investing	  a	  high	  proportion	  of	  its	  budget	  in	  projects	  not	  directly	  related	  to	  hosting	  the	  games:	  it	  spent	  only	  9.1%	  of	  total	  investment	  on	  sports	  facilities	  (p.	  7).	  The	  city	  focused	  its	  expenditures	  on	  urban	  renewal	  projects	  aimed	  at	  making	  the	  city	  more	  livable	  and	  attractive	  for	  business	  in	  the	  long	  run;	  it	  invested	  substantially	  in	  roads,	  sewage	  systems,	  green	  spaces,	  and	  its	  waterfront	  area.	  Brunet	  claims	  that	  Barcelona’s	  infrastructural	  improvements	  boosted	  business	  confidence	  in	  the	  city,	  thereby	  bringing	  in	  private	  capital	  and	  economic	  interest	  in	  the	  long	  run,	  while	  also	  independently	  raising	  residents’	  quality	  of	  life.	  Barcelona’s	  investments	  for	  the	  1992	  Games	  exemplify	  how	  hosts	  can	  use	  the	  impetus	  of	  mega-­‐events	  to	  push	  important	  infrastructure	  projects	  that	  benefit	  the	  local	  population	  long	  past	  the	  events.	  	  	  
Intangible	  benefits	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Hosting	  the	  World	  Cup	  or	  Olympics	  is	  thought	  to	  bring	  residents	  substantial	  non-­‐pecuniary	  benefits—enough	  to	  make	  them	  desirable	  despite	  high	  expenses.	  Barget	  and	  Gouguet	  (2006)	  posit	  that	  sporting	  events	  can	  increase	  social	  cohesion	  by	  using	  mass	  media	  to	  spread	  “universal	  values”	  among	  citizens	  (p.	  169).	  	  Engerman	  (2012)	  names	  municipal	  pride	  as	  one	  such	  value,	  and	  describes	  the	  individual	  advantages	  of	  considering	  one’s	  city	  an	  Olympic	  city.	  Event	  hosting	  ostensibly	  offers	  a	  city	  or	  country	  the	  opportunity	  to	  join	  an	  elite	  group	  of	  past	  hosts,	  and	  thereby	  signal	  its	  rising	  prominence.	  Jinxia	  and	  Mangan	  (2008)	  assert	  that	  China	  spent	  enormous	  sums	  on	  the	  2008	  Beijing	  Olympics	  in	  part	  to	  boost	  national	  pride	  and	  “erase	  the	  old	  memory	  of	  a	  humiliated	  and	  subordinated	  people	  and	  [replace]	  it	  with	  a	  new	  memory	  …	  of	  a	  confident,	  powerful	  and	  respected	  nation”	  (p.	  2026).	  They	  claim	  that	  Beijing	  2008	  emphasized	  lavish	  spectacle	  to	  compensate	  for	  historic	  exclusion	  from	  the	  sphere	  of	  powerful,	  Western	  nations	  (p.	  2027).	  	  The	  intangible	  facets	  of	  event	  hosting	  are	  also	  thought	  to	  have	  psychological	  and	  sociological	  benefits	  for	  the	  local	  population.	  Horne	  and	  Manzenreiter	  (2006)	  explain	  that	  citizens	  derive	  utility	  from	  the	  pride	  of	  hosting	  a	  mega-­‐event,	  and	  that	  doing	  so	  can	  help	  orient	  a	  city	  or	  country	  within	  the	  international	  landscape,	  especially	  in	  periods	  of	  flux	  (p.	  1).	  Waitt	  (2011)	  presents	  a	  Marxian	  view	  of	  the	  interplay	  between	  mega-­‐events	  and	  social	  dynamics:	  “spectacle	  is	  one	  mechanism	  that	  the	  local	  business	  and	  political	  elite	  can	  employ	  to	  prevent	  social	  unrest	  between	  high-­‐	  and	  low-­‐income	  stratum”	  (p.	  250).	  Furthermore,	  urban	  propaganda	  projects	  can	  restore	  feelings	  of	  community	  identity	  in	  fractured	  societies	  (p.	  253).	  	  But	  the	  intangible	  dimension	  of	  event	  hosting	  may	  hurt	  citizens,	  just	  as	  it	  may	  benefit	  them.	  Local	  residents’	  feelings	  of	  social	  cohesion	  may	  drop	  from	  the	  hooliganism	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and	  other	  nuisances	  that	  mega-­‐events	  tend	  to	  bring	  (Barget	  and	  Gouguet,	  2006,	  p.	  168).	  Furthermore,	  hosts	  may	  exploit	  their	  own	  cultural	  stereotypes,	  gloss	  over	  ethnic	  differences,	  and	  de-­‐historicize	  certain	  realities	  for	  marketing	  purposes,	  as	  Nauright	  (2004)	  claims	  South	  Africa	  did	  to	  host	  the	  1995	  Rugby	  World	  Cup.	  For	  example,	  the	  games	  used	  a	  song	  traditionally	  sung	  by	  migrant	  workers	  in	  dangerous	  mines	  and	  featured	  presentations	  of	  indigenous	  people	  as	  what	  Nauright	  calls	  “timeless	  African	  ‘natives’”	  (p.	  1327).	  His	  concern	  about	  “the	  packaging	  of	  an	  imagined	  vision	  of	  local	  culture	  for	  global	  consumption”	  (p.	  1328)	  applies	  to	  any	  country	  attempting	  to	  establish	  a	  brand	  in	  the	  international	  arena.	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Section	  4:	  BRIC	  differences	  
	   Countries	  deemed	  BRICS	  –	  Brazil,	  Russia,	  India	  and	  China	  –	  or	  semi-­‐periphery	  nations,	  have	  recently	  begun	  to	  compete	  for	  and	  win	  bids	  to	  host	  the	  World	  Cup	  and	  Olympics	  (see	  Figure	  1).	  Previously,	  high	  financial	  barriers	  to	  entry	  and	  selection	  traditions	  favoring	  Western	  European	  countries	  deterred	  developing	  countries	  from	  bidding.	  Although	  BRICs	  have	  joined	  the	  candidate	  lists	  alongside	  wealthy	  countries,	  hosting	  mega-­‐events	  exposes	  them	  to	  a	  unique	  set	  of	  risks	  and	  possibilities.	  Baade	  and	  Matheson	  state	  that	  the	  opportunity	  cost	  of	  investment	  for	  sporting	  projects	  is	  higher	  in	  less-­‐developed	  countries,	  as	  funds	  dedicated	  to	  constructing	  stadia,	  for	  example,	  could	  make	  a	  bigger	  impact	  improving	  health	  and	  education	  (2004,	  pp.	  14-­‐15).	  They	  caution	  that	  developing	  countries	  also	  struggle	  to	  attract	  large	  numbers	  of	  fans	  due	  to	  concerns	  about	  crime	  and	  infrastructure;	  their	  existing	  stadia	  probably	  require	  more	  refurbishments	  to	  meet	  FIFA	  or	  IOC	  standards;	  and	  that	  even	  non-­‐sports	  facilities	  (like	  hotels)	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  have	  low	  occupancy	  after	  the	  events	  because	  they	  receive	  less	  tourism	  (pp.	  1092-­‐1093).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  BRICs	  enjoy	  certain	  advantages	  in	  preparing	  to	  host,	  and	  have	  more	  to	  gain	  from	  FDI	  and	  infrastructure	  development.	  They	  tend	  to	  have	  lower	  construction	  costs	  due	  to	  cheap	  labor	  and	  high	  unemployment	  rates,	  so	  in	  absolute	  terms,	  the	  same	  infrastructure	  projects	  can	  cost	  less	  in	  semi-­‐periphery	  countries	  than	  in	  wealthier	  ones.	  Because	  developing	  countries	  probably	  have	  greater	  need	  for	  infrastructure	  improvements	  like	  better	  roads	  and	  airports,	  the	  projects	  spurred	  by	  mega-­‐events	  can	  be	  especially	  useful	  to	  them.	  They	  also	  have	  greater	  opportunities	  to	  use	  mega-­‐events	  as	  platforms	  to	  improve	  their	  international	  image;	  for	  example,	  Jinxia	  and	  Mangan	  (2008)	  determined	  that	  the	  2008	  Beijing	  Olympics	  succeeded	  in	  rallying	  Chinese	  national	  pride	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and	  attracting	  significant	  foreign	  media	  attention.	  Lastly,	  many	  of	  these	  countries	  have	  deeply	  entrenched	  soccer	  cultures,	  so	  they	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  continue	  using	  World	  Cup	  stadia	  (Baade	  &	  Matheson,	  2004).	  Regardless	  of	  these	  potential	  benefits,	  the	  spectacle	  of	  mega-­‐events	  seems	  not	  to	  satisfy	  BRIC	  citizens	  as	  a	  substitute	  for	  material	  improvements.	  Andreff	  (2006)	  expresses	  doubt	  that	  sporting	  events	  “make	  people	  forget	  underdevelopment,	  poverty,	  hunger	  and	  illiteracy”	  (p.	  308).	  Hosting	  mega-­‐events	  in	  the	  highly	  stratified	  cities	  often	  found	  in	  semi-­‐periphery	  countries	  may	  also	  produce	  undesirable	  social	  outcomes.	  Curi	  et	  al.	  (2011)	  contend	  that	  host	  cities	  cordon	  off	  “islands	  of	  excellence”	  (p.	  152)	  capable	  of	  showcasing	  their	  best	  features	  while	  hiding	  problems,	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  present	  their	  best	  image	  to	  the	  world.	  Islands	  of	  excellence	  produce	  appearances	  that	  can	  help	  shatter	  negative	  stereotypes	  about	  developing	  countries,	  but	  they	  are	  unproductive	  for	  addressing	  residents’	  true	  grievances.	  Additionally,	  the	  possibility	  of	  exclusively	  displaying	  islands	  of	  excellence	  lessens	  BRICs’	  incentives	  to	  cultivate	  broadly	  based	  urban	  development	  programs	  for	  citizens	  of	  all	  socioeconomic	  classes,	  thereby	  defeating	  a	  primary	  advantage	  of	  hosting.	  Developing	  countries	  often	  choose	  to	  conceal	  unpleasant	  social	  realities	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  image,	  thereby	  squandering	  the	  impetus	  to	  address	  the	  very	  problems	  that	  mega-­‐events	  could	  have	  helped	  improve.	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Section	  5:	  Predictions	  for	  Brazil	  
	  
	   The	  general	  theories	  and	  specific	  host	  experiences	  presented	  thus	  far	  inform	  this	  project’s	  expectations	  for	  how	  the	  World	  Cup	  and	  Olympics	  will	  affect	  Brazil.	  Sections	  3	  and	  4	  showed	  that	  countries	  rarely	  experience	  an	  economic	  boost	  from	  hosting	  and	  tend	  to	  abandon	  infrastructure	  projects	  that	  could	  have	  been	  used	  by	  the	  population	  in	  the	  long	  run.	  If	  host	  countries	  nearly	  universally	  fail	  to	  deliver	  on	  their	  economic	  and	  infrastructural	  promises,	  it	  follows	  that	  Brazil	  will	  fare	  similarly.	  Observers	  should	  expect	  Brazil’s	  World	  Cup	  and	  Olympics	  to	  yield	  insignificant	  economic	  benefits	  and	  to	  generate	  infrastructure	  designed	  mostly	  for	  short-­‐term	  rather	  than	  long-­‐term	  use.	  	  	   If	  mega-­‐events	  are	  ineffective	  development	  tools,	  Brazil	  is	  unlikely	  to	  reap	  those	  types	  of	  benefits	  as	  well.	  Though	  Brazil	  has	  made	  impressive	  progress	  alleviating	  poverty	  and	  invested	  heavily	  in	  social	  sector	  programs,	  its	  development	  level	  remains	  relatively	  low:	  it	  ranked	  85th	  out	  of	  187	  countries	  on	  the	  United	  Nations	  Development	  Project’s	  Human	  Development	  Index	  in	  2012.	  Despite	  any	  improvements,	  the	  government’s	  poor	  public	  services	  continue	  to	  frustrate	  Brazilian	  citizens,	  whose	  tax	  rate	  is	  among	  the	  highest	  in	  Latin	  America.	  For	  example,	  78%	  and	  68%	  of	  Brazilians	  reported	  dissatisfaction	  with	  public	  hospitals	  and	  education,	  respectively,	  in	  a	  2011	  Latinobarómetro	  poll.	  If	  hosting	  mega-­‐events	  does	  not	  increase	  development,	  as	  argued	  in	  Section	  4,	  then	  Brazil’s	  World	  Cup	  and	  Olympics	  are	  also	  unlikely	  to	  provide	  that	  apparently	  much-­‐desired	  benefit.	  	  	   Given	  the	  odds	  of	  disappointment,	  other	  advantages	  must	  justify	  the	  costs	  of	  hosting—estimated	  at	  US$13.3	  billion	  for	  the	  World	  Cup	  and	  more	  than	  US$15	  billion	  for	  the	  Olympics	  (Boykoff	  &	  Gaffney,	  2013).	  If	  the	  Brazilian	  government	  were	  aware	  of	  the	  risks,	  its	  cost-­‐benefit	  analysis	  must	  have	  placed	  a	  high	  premium	  on	  other	  benefits	  for	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Section	  6:	  Methodology	  I	  distributed	  online	  surveys	  to	  Brazilians	  in	  order	  to	  gauge	  the	  population’s	  attitudes	  toward	  hosting	  the	  World	  Cup	  and	  Olympics.	  The	  survey	  measures	  intangible	  benefits	  that	  do	  not	  show	  up	  in	  straight	  cost-­‐benefit	  accounting	  but	  are	  nonetheless	  cited	  by	  the	  government	  as	  compelling	  reasons	  for	  hosting	  the	  events	  (Section	  7	  summarizes	  these	  statements).	  Many	  of	  the	  questions	  directly	  assess	  how	  Brazilians	  respond	  to	  claims	  made	  by	  the	  organizing	  committees	  for	  the	  World	  Cup	  and	  Olympics.	  I	  include	  the	  survey	  questions	  in	  Appendix	  A.	  Scholars	  have	  applied	  economic	  techniques	  to	  measuring	  sporting	  events’	  abstract	  benefits.	  Johnson,	  et	  al.	  (2001)	  paved	  the	  way	  for	  using	  contingent	  valuation	  methods	  (CVM)	  to	  measure	  willingness	  to	  pay	  (WTP)	  for	  sporting	  teams	  within	  a	  city.	  Heyne,	  et	  al.	  (2007)	  applied	  CVM	  to	  mega-­‐sporting	  events,	  surveying	  Germans	  before	  the	  2006	  World	  Cup	  on	  their	  WTP	  to	  keep	  the	  events	  if	  it	  was	  under	  threat	  of	  changing	  locations.	  I	  modeled	  my	  WTP	  question	  on	  theirs.	  CVM	  was	  my	  only	  attempt	  to	  quantify	  how	  much	  Brazilians	  value	  the	  feel-­‐good	  effect.	  The	  remainder	  of	  the	  questionnaire	  examines	  the	  perceived	  opportunity	  cost	  of	  hosting	  the	  events.	  I	  asked	  respondents	  which	  stakeholders	  they	  believe	  benefit	  relative	  to	  the	  others	  and	  to	  themselves,	  their	  views	  on	  hosting	  the	  events	  considering	  the	  costs,	  and	  where	  they	  would	  prefer	  to	  see	  the	  public	  money	  invested	  (if	  anywhere).	  The	  survey	  seeks	  to	  isolate	  the	  personal	  utility	  Brazilians	  may	  derive	  from	  hosting	  the	  World	  Cup	  or	  Olympics.	  	  	   With	  input	  from	  Brazilian	  and	  U.S.	  researchers,	  I	  created	  two	  surveys	  with	  almost	  identical	  questions,	  one	  about	  the	  World	  Cup	  and	  the	  other	  about	  the	  Olympics.	  Qualtrics	  software	  randomized	  which	  survey	  was	  displayed	  to	  respondents,	  eliminating	  selection	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bias.	  Respondents	  were	  restricted	  to	  Brazilians	  only;	  all	  respondents	  received	  an	  option	  to	  take	  the	  survey	  in	  Portuguese	  or	  English.	  Respondents	  took	  the	  surveys	  analyzed	  in	  this	  project	  from	  September	  30,	  2013	  through	  November	  10,	  2013.	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  all	  surveys	  were	  completed	  after	  the	  June	  2013	  FIFA	  Confederations	  Cup	  in	  Brazil	  (which	  coincided	  with	  and	  fueled	  mass	  protests	  about	  the	  raise	  in	  bus	  fares).	  Curi	  noted	  that	  the	  Confederations	  Cup,	  a	  “test	  run”	  for	  the	  following	  year’s	  World	  Cup,	  marked	  a	  turning	  point	  for	  many	  Brazilians’	  views	  on	  the	  upcoming	  mega-­‐events,	  because	  it	  made	  them	  aware	  for	  the	  first	  time	  of	  the	  high	  ticket	  prices,	  commercial	  restrictions,	  and	  excessive	  security	  ordeals	  they	  should	  expect	  to	  repeat	  in	  2014	  and	  2016	  (personal	  communication,	  August	  21,	  2013).	  He	  noted	  that	  many	  Brazilians	  were	  surprised	  and	  aggravated	  by	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  FIFA,	  rather	  than	  Brazilian	  sports	  organizations,	  controlled	  the	  Confederations	  Cup.	  The	  survey	  responses	  may	  reflect	  more	  negativity	  towards	  hosting	  the	  World	  Cup	  and	  Olympics	  because	  it	  was	  offered	  after	  the	  possible	  public	  opinion	  shifts	  of	  June	  2013.	  	  This	  project	  is	  also	  limited	  by	  having	  distributed	  the	  survey	  only	  once,	  in	  advance	  of	  the	  World	  Cup	  and	  Olympics,	  because	  evidence	  suggests	  that	  citizens’	  opinions	  toward	  mega-­‐events	  may	  change	  over	  time.	  Surveys	  taken	  before	  the	  games	  may	  underestimate	  how	  residents	  value	  the	  future	  non-­‐pecuniary	  benefits.	  In	  their	  study	  of	  Germans’	  response	  to	  hosting	  the	  2006	  World	  Cup,	  for	  example,	  Heyne	  et	  al.	  (2007)	  sampled	  respondents	  before	  and	  after	  the	  events,	  and	  found	  that	  ex-­‐post	  average	  WTP	  was	  significantly	  higher	  then	  ex-­‐ante.	  	  Specifically,	  levels	  of	  positive	  WTP	  rose	  from	  20%	  of	  Germans	  before	  to	  42.6%	  afterward,	  for	  an	  increase	  of	  129%	  (p.	  4).	  They	  note	  that	  the	  increase	  mainly	  stemmed	  from	  individuals	  who	  originally	  reported	  zero	  WTP	  and	  changed	  their	  minds	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after	  the	  event,	  rather	  than	  from	  large	  increases	  among	  those	  who	  had	  positive	  WTP	  all	  along	  (p.	  6).	  Those	  with	  lower	  education	  levels	  may	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  change	  their	  minds	  because	  it	  is	  difficult	  for	  them	  to	  evaluate	  abstract	  intangibles	  without	  experiencing	  them	  directly	  (p.	  6).	  These	  caveats	  apply	  to	  my	  survey	  results	  as	  well:	  as	  an	  ex-­‐ante	  study,	  this	  survey	  may	  capture	  more	  negative	  views	  than	  an	  ex-­‐post	  one	  would,	  and	  the	  findings	  therefore	  might	  be	  biased	  pessimistically	  within	  a	  longer	  timeframe.	  Still,	  my	  project	  suggests	  that	  evaluating	  an	  event	  after	  it	  has	  passed	  does	  not	  necessarily	  ensure	  high	  approval	  ratings.5	  	  The	  primary	  sampling	  method	  for	  this	  survey	  was	  snowball	  sampling,	  which	  has	  the	  drawback	  of	  skewing	  the	  responses	  toward	  a	  more	  educated,	  upper	  class	  group,	  as	  these	  individuals	  were	  most	  apt	  to	  be	  in	  contact	  with	  an	  American	  college	  student.	  I	  also	  promoted	  my	  survey	  on	  various	  Brazilian	  pages	  of	  Facebook,	  Twitter	  and	  LinkedIn.	  Distributing	  the	  survey	  exclusively	  online	  also	  contributed	  to	  socioeconomic	  bias,	  as	  poorer	  respondents	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  own	  or	  have	  access	  to	  computers	  to	  take	  this	  survey,	  even	  if	  they	  were	  aware	  of	  it.	  I	  offered	  $1.00	  on	  MTurk,	  a	  crowdsourcing	  website,	  to	  recruit	  more	  respondents,	  but	  that	  method	  yielded	  only	  ten	  of	  102	  total	  responses,	  thereby	  failing	  to	  correct	  for	  the	  small	  sample	  of	  low-­‐income	  Brazilians.	  This	  skew	  might	  have	  a	  range	  of	  effects,	  because	  different	  socioeconomic	  groups	  may	  be	  impacted	  differently	  from	  hosting	  the	  events,	  and	  therefore	  might	  respond	  in	  distinct	  ways.	  It	  seems	  reasonable	  to	  surmise	  that	  high-­‐income	  Brazilians	  are	  most	  supportive	  because	  they	  could	  benefit	  from	  increased	  business	  and	  tourism,	  along	  with	  lower-­‐class	  Brazilians	  on	  the	  opposite	  end	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  One	  survey	  question	  in	  this	  project	  assessed	  views	  on	  the	  Confederations	  Cup.	  Respondents’	  ex-­‐post	  evaluation	  of	  that	  recent	  event	  was	  nonetheless	  mostly	  negative:	  47%	  of	  respondents	  reported	  feeling	  unsatisfied	  with	  how	  Brazil	  hosted	  those	  games,	  compared	  to	  19%	  satisfied	  and	  34%	  with	  no	  opinion.	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spectrum,	  as	  they	  may	  be	  most	  susceptible	  to	  the	  thrill	  of	  spectacle	  and	  least	  critical	  toward	  lofty	  promises.	  Brazil’s	  middle	  class,	  which	  led	  the	  June	  2013	  protests	  that	  denounced	  spending	  on	  mega-­‐events,	  likely	  holds	  the	  most	  negative	  views	  on	  hosting.	  They	  pay	  high	  tax	  rates,	  unlike	  the	  lowest	  income	  groups,	  but	  are	  vulnerable	  to	  poor	  public	  health	  and	  education	  systems,	  because	  they	  cannot	  pay	  for	  private	  services	  like	  the	  wealthy	  can.	  On	  net,	  the	  overrepresentation	  of	  high-­‐income	  Brazilians	  (from	  classes	  A	  and	  B)6	  in	  this	  sample	  may	  skew	  the	  results	  in	  favor	  of	  hosting,	  but	  perhaps	  the	  absence	  of	  low-­‐income	  respondents	  (from	  class	  E)	  would	  further	  drive	  up	  approval.	  Table	  2	  shows	  a	  breakdown	  of	  respondent	  demographics.	  
Table	  2:	  Demographic	  overview	  of	  respondent	  pool	   	  
	  Gender	   Male:	  48%	  Female:	  52%	  Age	   18-­‐29:	  51%	  30-­‐45:	  33%	  45-­‐59:	  14%	  60+:	  	  	  	  2%	  Social	  class	  (A	  is	  highest,	  E	  is	  lowest)	   A:	  22%	  B:	  44%	  C:	  24%	  D:	  3%	  Prefer	  not	  to	  say:	  5%	  Education	  (highest	  level	  achieved)	   Primary:	  1%	  Secondary:	  5%	  Tertiary:	  64%	  Masters/PhD:	  30%	  City	  of	  origin	  (top	  4)	   São	  Paulo:	  32%	  Recife:	  20%	  Rio	  de	  Janeiro:	  12%	  Belém:	  8%	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  The	  Brazilian	  government	  classifies	  citizens	  into	  classes	  A	  through	  E	  according	  to	  income	  levels.	  Households	  in	  Classes	  A	  and	  B	  are	  in	  the	  highest	  socioeconomic	  categories,	  C	  and	  D	  are	  middle	  class,	  and	  E	  are	  below	  the	  poverty	  line.	  	  According	  to	  a	  study	  by	  Fundação	  Getulio	  Vargas,	  in	  2008	  Classes	  A	  and	  B	  together	  represented	  10.42%	  of	  the	  total	  population,	  Class	  C	  49.2%,	  class	  D	  24.4%,	  and	  Class	  E	  16.0%.	  Monthly	  total	  household	  income	  (in	  December	  2008	  prices)	  are	  >R$4,807	  for	  Classes	  A	  and	  B,	  R$1,115-­‐4,807	  for	  Class	  C,	  R$804-­‐1,115	  for	  Class	  D,	  and	  <R$804	  for	  Class	  E	  (Neri	  &	  Coutinho	  de	  Melo,	  2009).	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A	  content	  analysis	  of	  letters	  to	  the	  editor	  (LTE)	  offers	  further	  insight	  into	  the	  homegrown	  Brazilian	  public	  opinion	  from	  the	  time	  the	  bids	  were	  awarded	  for	  the	  World	  Cup	  and	  Olympics.	  Studies	  show	  that	  LTEs	  tend	  to	  accurately	  reflect	  public	  opinion.	  Nielsen	  (2010)	  emphasizes	  that	  the	  section	  is	  unique	  for	  combining	  “a	  classical	  form	  of	  mass	  publicity	  with	  the	  disagreement	  and	  occasional	  give-­‐and-­‐take	  of	  debate”	  (p.	  23).	  Wahl-­‐Jorgensen	  (2001)	  adds	  that	  LTE	  sections,	  as	  “mediated	  sites	  of	  public	  discourse”	  (p.	  303),	  are	  curated	  by	  editors	  to	  reflect	  private	  individuals’	  thoughts	  rather	  than	  activists’	  opinions	  (p.	  311).	  Letters	  to	  the	  editor	  are	  relevant	  to	  my	  project	  as	  a	  rare	  form	  of	  public	  participation	  on	  questions	  of	  hosting;	  only	  4%	  of	  respondents	  to	  this	  project’s	  survey	  reported	  having	  had	  an	  opportunity	  to	  express	  their	  opinions	  on	  the	  World	  Cup	  or	  Olympics.	  This	  paper’s	  content	  analysis	  attempts	  to	  decipher	  the	  overall	  tone	  and	  nature	  of	  the	  arguments	  in	  that	  section	  (LTEs).	  	  This	  study	  relied	  on	  Folha	  de	  S.	  Paulo,	  a	  daily	  newspaper	  based	  in	  São	  Paulo.	  Folha	  
de	  S.	  Paulo	  is	  Brazil’s	  most	  widely	  circulated	  daily	  newspaper,	  with	  an	  average	  of	  301,299	  copies	  circulated	  daily	  in	  2012,	  according	  to	  the	  Brazilian	  media-­‐auditing	  firm	  Instituto	  Verificador	  de	  Circulação.	  Folha	  de	  S.	  Paulo	  is	  ideologically	  left	  leaning,	  and	  its	  readership	  consists	  mostly	  of	  the	  elite	  and	  middle	  classes—A	  through	  C	  by	  Brazil’s	  classification	  (Herscovitz,	  2004,	  p.	  72).	  	  
Folha	  de	  S.	  Paulo	  was	  also	  a	  convenient	  choice	  of	  newspaper	  because	  it	  allows	  users	  to	  search	  within	  a	  particular	  section.	  I	  used	  broad	  search	  terms	  in	  order	  to	  return	  all	  potentially	  relevant	  content	  (“Copa”	  for	  the	  World	  Cup,	  and	  “Olímpiadas”	  for	  the	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  7	  “Copa”	  yielded	  513	  total	  letters,	  many	  of	  which	  were	  strictly	  football-­‐related,	  and	  “Olimpíadas”	  yielded	  46	  total	  letters.	  For	  this	  reason,	  I	  selected	  two	  time	  periods	  for	  World	  Cup-­‐related	  letters,	  and	  only	  one	  for	  Olympic-­‐related	  ones.	  	  8	  Six	  weeks	  before	  the	  event	  through	  six	  weeks	  after.	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Section	  7:	  Brazil’s	  experience	  
	  
Stated	  reasons	  for	  hosting	  
	   Public	  statements	  made	  by	  the	  Brazilian	  Olympic	  Organizing	  Committee	  (BOOC)	  and	  the	  World	  Cup	  Local	  Organizing	  Committee	  (LOC)	  match	  the	  three	  theoretical	  justifications	  for	  hosting	  mega-­‐events:	  economic	  stimulus,	  infrastructural	  legacy,	  and	  a	  feel-­‐good	  effect.	  In	  its	  official	  Copa	  2014	  website,	  the	  Brazilian	  federal	  government	  enumerates	  the	  benefits	  it	  expects	  the	  World	  Cup	  to	  bring:	  “For	  all	  Brazilians	  …	  a	  relevant	  legacy	  will	  remain	  in	  infrastructure,	  creation	  of	  jobs,	  income	  and	  promotion	  of	  the	  country’s	  image	  on	  a	  global	  scale”	  (World	  Cup	  Portal).	  The	  Rio	  2016	  Olympic	  Organizing	  Committee	  echoes	  these	  reasons,	  citing	  the	  opportunity	  to	  bring	  sustainable	  development	  to	  Brazil	  through	  urban	  infrastructure,	  environmental	  and	  social	  initiatives,	  stimulating	  the	  economy,	  bringing	  in	  tourism,	  as	  well	  as,	  “gaining	  for	  Brazil	  a	  new	  level	  of	  international	  recognition	  and	  enhancing	  its	  reputation	  as	  a	  thrilling	  place,	  where	  living,	  doing	  business	  and	  travelling	  is	  an	  excellent	  option”	  (Rio	  2016	  Organizing	  Committee	  website).	  These	  claims	  suggest	  that	  Brazilian	  boosters	  indeed	  subscribe	  to	  traditional	  rationales	  for	  event	  hosting,	  which	  sets	  up	  the	  framework	  for	  testing	  their	  actual	  adherence	  to	  these	  promises	  in	  the	  remainder	  of	  this	  paper.	  
Bidding	  process	   	  
	   Bidding	  to	  host	  a	  mega-­‐event	  is	  a	  notoriously	  abstruse	  and	  undemocratic	  process.	  It	  seemed	  almost	  inevitable	  that	  Brazil	  bade	  for	  and	  won	  the	  World	  Cup.	  FIFA	  was	  nearly	  certain	  to	  choose	  Brazil	  to	  host	  the	  World	  Cup	  due	  to	  its	  rotating	  continent	  selection	  process	  and	  weak	  competition	  from	  Argentina	  and	  Colombia,	  the	  only	  other	  South	  American	  countries	  to	  submit	  bids.	  Securing	  the	  Olympics	  was	  a	  more	  impressive	  feat,	  as	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Rio	  de	  Janeiro	  beat	  out	  established	  cities	  like	  Chicago,	  Madrid	  and	  Tokyo.	  Curi	  described	  the	  mood	  when	  Brazil	  won	  both	  events	  in	  2007:	  winning	  the	  World	  Cup	  bid	  was	  a	  “dream	  come	  true,”	  while	  hosting	  the	  Olympics	  brought	  “symbolic	  value,”	  affirming	  Brazil’s	  membership	  in	  the	  developed	  world	  (personal	  communication,	  August	  21,	  2013).	  	  Brazilian	  politicians,	  along	  with	  the	  Brazilian	  Football	  Confederation	  (CBF)	  and	  the	  Rio	  2016	  Local	  Organizing	  Committee,	  drove	  the	  bids	  and	  publically	  displayed	  their	  delight	  at	  securing	  the	  contracts.	  Upon	  FIFA’s	  announcement,	  CBF	  president	  Ricardo	  Teixeira	  proclaimed:	  “we	  are	  a	  civilized	  nation,	  a	  nation	  that	  is	  going	  through	  an	  excellent	  phase”	  (Romero,	  2013).	  	  Former	  Brazilian	  President	  Luiz	  Inácio	  Lula	  da	  Silva	  and	  Mayor	  of	  Rio	  de	  Janeiro	  Eduardo	  Paes	  shared	  a	  spirited	  embrace	  at	  a	  press	  conference	  following	  the	  Olympic	  announcement	  (Givhan	  &	  Shipley,	  2009).	  Celebrations,	  complete	  with	  fireworks	  and	  oversized	  flags,	  erupted	  in	  cities	  across	  Brazil	  as	  it	  received	  the	  news	  that	  they	  would	  host	  the	  events.	  Sports	  scholar	  Christopher	  Gaffney	  explains	  that	  soccer	  has	  historically	  served	  as	  a	  unifying	  force	  for	  an	  ethnically	  and	  socioeconomically	  divided	  Brazilian	  population	  (2008,	  p.	  50-­‐51).	  Brazil’s	  celebrations	  in	  2007	  and	  2009	  exemplify	  the	  temporary	  euphoria	  and	  distraction	  achieved	  by	  using	  sport	  as	  “bread	  and	  circus”	  for	  the	  masses;	  that	  is,	  before	  the	  expenditures	  and	  broken	  promises	  became	  apparent.	  
Spending	  and	  construction	  	   Leading	  up	  to	  its	  bid	  for	  the	  World	  Cup	  and	  Olympics,	  Brazil	  published	  conservative	  cost	  estimates	  commonly	  considered	  necessary	  to	  attain	  the	  mega-­‐event.	  In	  the	  official	  Bid	  Book	  submitted	  to	  FIFA,	  CBF	  estimated	  the	  investment	  in	  stadium	  construction	  and	  remodeling	  at	  US$1.1	  billion,	  and	  emphasized	  the	  use	  of	  private	  funding	  sources	  and	  private-­‐public	  partnerships	  (PPPs)	  (“Brazil	  Bid:	  Inspection	  Report	  for	  the	  2014	  FIFA	  World	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Cup,”	  2007).	  The	  Rio	  2016	  Organizing	  Committee	  committed	  to	  funding	  the	  R$5.6	  billion	  budget	  through	  private	  sources,	  but	  acknowledged	  that	  public	  funding	  would	  cover	  any	  shortfalls.	  The	  LOC	  also	  noted	  that	  the	  Brazilian	  government	  will	  be	  responsible	  for	  the	  R$23.2	  billion	  cost	  of	  “venue	  and	  infrastructure	  works”—a	  figure	  that	  dwarfs	  the	  private	  funding	  it	  intends	  to	  secure	  for	  other	  facilities.	  These	  vaguely	  defined	  public	  projects	  can	  range	  in	  utility	  to	  the	  Brazilian	  people,	  from	  practical	  roads,	  trains	  and	  airports,	  to	  eventual	  white	  elephant	  stadia.	  The	  LOC	  notably	  does	  not	  specify	  the	  cost	  breakdowns	  in	  advance,	  leaving	  Brazil	  vulnerable	  to	  typical	  patterns	  of	  infrastructure	  spending	  for	  mega-­‐events:	  large	  investments	  in	  stadia	  and	  small	  ones	  in	  long-­‐term	  projects.	  	  	   Brazil	  has	  spent	  enormous	  sums	  to	  meet	  FIFA	  and	  IOC	  infrastructure	  expectations	  by	  the	  Games’	  arrival,	  financing	  projects	  with	  private	  and	  public	  funds	  (as	  well	  as	  hybrid	  PPPs).	  However,	  it	  appears	  that	  construction	  has	  focused	  disproportionately	  on	  stadia	  and	  ignored	  long-­‐term	  development	  strategies	  that	  are	  a	  possible	  benefit	  of	  hosting	  mega-­‐events.	  Gaffney	  (2010)	  notes	  that	  Brazil	  did	  not	  have	  a	  single	  FIFA-­‐standard	  stadium	  when	  it	  bade	  for	  the	  World	  Cup;	  it	  would	  need	  12	  by	  2014	  (p.	  21).	  Private	  parties	  and	  the	  state	  government	  have	  poured	  about	  R$1	  billion	  into	  renovating	  the	  famous	  Maracanã	  stadium	  in	  Rio,	  adding	  an	  enormous	  parking	  garage,	  attaching	  a	  shopping	  mall,	  and	  installing	  a	  roof	  extension	  (p.	  20).	  Gaffney	  states	  that	  World	  Cup	  stadium	  construction	  will	  cost	  more	  than	  R$4.35	  billion	  (Table	  2),	  and	  that	  construction	  for	  the	  Olympics	  will	  be	  similarly	  expensive	  and	  disruptive	  to	  the	  communities	  around	  the	  Olympic	  Village	  (p.18).	  As	  expected,	  the	  government	  has	  neglected	  flagship	  projects	  that	  could	  have	  produced	  greater	  legacies	  than	  stadia,	  and	  were	  major	  selling	  points	  for	  hosting.	  In	  August	  2013,	  the	  Brazilian	  government	  for	  the	  third	  time	  delayed	  plans	  for	  an	  ambitious	  bullet	  train	  to	  link	  São	  Paulo	  with	  Rio	  de	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Janeiro	  by	  the	  2016	  Olympics	  (Trevisani	  &	  Winterstein,	  2013).	  Gaffney	  questions	  whether	  other	  events-­‐related	  projects	  “are	  targeting	  the	  chronic	  problems	  of	  Rio	  de	  Janeiro,”	  (p.25);	  in	  other	  words,	  whether	  Brazil	  is	  fulfilling	  its	  promise	  to	  use	  these	  mega-­‐events	  to	  promote	  sustainable	  urban	  development.	  	  
Table	  2:	  Cost	  of	  Stadium	  Construction	  in	  12	  World	  Cup	  Cities	  
 
 (Gaffney,	  2010,	  p.	  22)	  
	   The	  costs	  can	  be	  especially	  high	  for	  new	  stadia,	  many	  of	  which	  stand	  less	  of	  a	  chance	  of	  being	  used	  after	  the	  games,	  as	  with	  the	  R$600	  million	  stadium	  in	  Manaus—a	  city	  without	  a	  top-­‐division	  soccer	  team	  (Borden,	  2013).	  Its	  Arena	  Amazonia	  is	  likely	  to	  become	  an	  expensive	  white	  elephant	  with	  little	  use	  to	  justify	  the	  costs	  after	  the	  World	  Cup.	  (The	  state	  government	  has	  proposed	  converting	  it	  to	  a	  prison	  once	  the	  games	  pass—surely	  an	  expensive	  way	  to	  fund	  corrections	  facilities.)	  Image	  1	  shows	  the	  stadium	  far	  from	  complete	  in	  September	  2013,	  less	  than	  a	  year	  before	  it	  must	  be	  operational	  for	  the	  World	  Cup.	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Image	  1:	  Arena	  Amazonia	  in	  September	  2013	  (Manaus,	  Brazil)	  
	  (Almeida,	  2013)	  Cost	  overruns	  can	  be	  attributed	  in	  part	  to	  project	  delays	  that	  are	  inevitable	  when	  doing	  business	  in	  Brazil.	  Capela,	  Cottle,	  and	  Furlan	  Meirinho	  (2013)	  allege	  that	  “construction	  cartels”	  collude	  to	  drive	  up	  the	  prices	  of	  government-­‐funded	  construction	  projects	  in	  order	  to	  profit	  from	  public	  resources.	  They	  note	  that	  World	  Cup	  stadia	  built	  for	  South	  Africa,	  which	  has	  similar	  construction	  cartels,	  cost	  more	  than	  ten	  times	  the	  original	  estimates.	  They	  claim	  that	  the	  Brazilian	  forecast	  is	  no	  brighter,	  based	  on	  the	  present	  state	  of	  construction	  delays	  and	  cost	  overruns:	  as	  of	  May	  2012,	  41%	  of	  World	  Cup	  construction	  had	  not	  begun,	  and	  the	  cost	  of	  two	  stadia	  alone	  (Mané	  Garrincha	  Stadium	  in	  Brasília	  and	  Maracanã	  Stadium	  in	  Rio	  de	  Janeiro)	  have	  doubled	  since	  2010,	  now	  exceeding	  the	  total	  projected	  cost	  of	  all	  stadia.	  Recent	  government	  policy	  may	  further	  incentivize	  these	  project	  delays:	  the	  federal	  government	  added	  an	  exceptionality	  status	  provision	  to	  its	  project-­‐approval	  process	  in	  order	  to	  expedite	  the	  process.	  Construction	  companies	  now	  may	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  collude	  to	  raise	  their	  bidding	  prices,	  knowing	  that	  the	  urgency	  and	  legal	  loopholes	  will	  reduce	  suspicious	  inquiries	  (Capela,	  Cottle	  &	  Mairinho,	  2013).	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Brazil’s	  corrupt	  institutions	  make	  it	  especially	  risky	  to	  inject	  large	  sums	  of	  money	  into	  construction	  projects.	  Brazil	  ranks	  69th	  in	  Transparency	  International’s	  2012	  Corruption	  Perceptions	  Index,	  with	  a	  score	  of	  43	  out	  of	  100	  (where	  0	  is	  highly	  corrupt).	  Gaffney	  said	  in	  an	  interview	  with	  Inside	  World	  Football:	  “The	  World	  Cup	  is	  a	  perfect	  storm	  of	  a	  problem.	  FIFA	  came	  with	  a	  top	  down	  approach	  into	  a	  system	  that	  was	  already	  inefficient,	  corrupt	  and	  wieldy.	  Mega	  events	  reach	  right	  into	  those	  channels”	  (as	  cited	  in	  Nicholson,	  2013).	  Andreff	  (2006)	  agrees	  that	  the	  inflow	  of	  funds	  for	  sporting	  events	  can	  increase	  embezzlement	  and	  corruption	  in	  developing	  countries	  (p.	  313).	  This	  leaves	  Brazil	  at	  an	  even	  greater	  risk	  of	  overspending,	  sidelining	  long-­‐term	  infrastructure	  projects	  to	  focus	  on	  constructing	  the	  stadia	  required	  by	  FIFA,	  and	  blocking	  the	  benefits	  from	  accruing	  to	  the	  local	  populations.	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Section	  8:	  	  Brazilians’	  perception	  of	  intangible	  benefits	  	   Given	  the	  strong	  reasons	  to	  doubt	  Brazilian	  boosters’	  claims	  about	  the	  positive	  economic	  and	  infrastructural	  effects	  of	  hosting	  the	  World	  Cup	  and	  Olympics,	  I	  test	  its	  final	  and	  most	  plausible	  claim:	  that	  the	  intangible,	  feel-­‐good	  effect	  is	  enough	  to	  justify	  the	  costs.	  On	  the	  surface,	  existing	  opinion	  polls	  of	  Brazilians	  suggest	  that	  the	  country	  might	  indeed	  have	  a	  public	  relations	  problem	  that	  might	  be	  resolved	  by	  hosting	  mega-­‐events.	  The	  Anholt	  GfK-­‐Roper	  Nation	  and	  City	  Brands	  Indices,	  a	  poll	  measuring	  cities’	  and	  countries’	  international	  reputations,	  illuminates	  the	  chasm	  between	  Brazil’s	  self-­‐image	  versus	  its	  perception	  abroad.	  In	  2009,	  Brazilian	  respondents	  ranked	  their	  country	  as	  the	  number	  one	  holiday	  destination	  (out	  of	  50);	  in	  contrast,	  Americans	  ranked	  it	  18th,	  Germans	  ranked	  it	  16th,	  and	  the	  Japanese	  ranked	  it	  27th.	  In	  the	  same	  nations	  index,	  Brazilians	  also	  rate	  their	  culture	  first,	  while	  Americans	  ranked	  it	  17th,	  Germans	  ranked	  it	  15th,	  and	  the	  Japanese	  ranked	  it	  12th	  (Anholt,	  2009).	  If	  Brazilians	  are	  aware	  of	  their	  less-­‐than-­‐stellar	  reputation	  among	  foreigners,	  then	  they	  might	  indeed	  value	  events	  that	  boost	  their	  country’s	  image	  abroad,	  validating	  that	  reason	  for	  hosting	  mega-­‐events.	  Still,	  if	  boosters’	  justification	  for	  hosting	  these	  costly	  events	  hinges	  on	  Brazilians	  valuing	  its	  intangible	  benefits,	  then	  assessing	  grassroots	  support	  requires	  more	  direct	  insight	  and	  nuanced	  analysis.	  To	  my	  knowledge,	  no	  prior	  survey	  has	  assessed	  citizens’	  views	  on	  these	  events.	  
Survey	  results	  	  	   The	  survey	  responses	  reveal	  ambivalent	  attitudes	  towards	  the	  World	  Cup	  and	  Olympics,	  which	  become	  less	  favorable	  when	  respondents	  are	  provided	  with	  information	  about	  the	  cost	  of	  the	  event.	  Virtually	  no	  respondent	  answers	  affirmatively	  to	  questions	  of	  democratic	  participation	  in	  hosting	  the	  events,	  or	  to	  the	  willingness	  to	  pay	  question.	  In	  the	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hypothetical	  CVM	  question,	  95%	  of	  respondents	  would	  refuse	  to	  pay	  any	  money	  to	  keep	  the	  events	  in	  Brazil.	  Of	  the	  five	  who	  say	  they	  would	  pay,	  the	  average	  amount	  was	  R$25.20;	  however,	  the	  vast	  majority	  who	  are	  unwilling	  to	  pay	  shrinks	  the	  median	  WTP	  to	  zero.	  	  
Figure	  5:	  General	  ambivalence	  towards	  hosting	  
	  
	  
	   This	  seeming	  indifference	  to	  event	  hosting,	  and	  unwillingness	  to	  pay	  for	  it,	  makes	  sense	  in	  light	  of	  Brazil’s	  notoriously	  poor	  social	  services—the	  focus	  of	  the	  June	  2013	  protests.	  Only	  2	  of	  94	  respondents,	  or	  2%,	  prefer	  that	  the	  Brazilian	  government	  currently	  focus	  on	  games-­‐related	  projects	  instead	  of	  social	  services;	  the	  decisive	  majority	  prioritizes	  improving	  social	  services.	  When	  asked	  what	  outcomes	  they	  would	  like	  to	  see	  from	  the	  World	  Cup	  or	  Olympics,	  most	  mention	  development	  projects	  (including	  better	  transportation	  and	  public	  safety	  and	  more	  investment	  in	  health	  and	  education)	  while	  few	  indicate	  a	  desire	  for	  improved	  stadia	  or	  more	  international	  exposure.	  	  In	  a	  highly	  stratified	  society	  like	  Brazil’s,	  public	  opinion	  likely	  falls	  along	  predictable	  demographic	  lines,	  and	  that	  seems	  to	  be	  the	  case	  with	  attitudes	  toward	  mega-­‐events.	  Before	  cost	  is	  mentioned,	  support	  for	  hosting	  the	  World	  Cup	  or	  Olympics	  peaks	  among	  Recife	  residents,	  women,	  young	  people	  and	  middle-­‐aged	  people,	  members	  of	  Class	  B	  (upper	  middle	  class),	  and	  those	  with	  more	  education.	  The	  most	  opposed	  groups	  are	  members	  of	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Class	  C	  (lower-­‐middle	  class)	  and	  individuals	  ages	  30-­‐44.	  Table	  3	  shows	  how	  public	  opinion	  divides	  along	  demographic	  groups.	  	   Not	  surprisingly,	  after	  cost	  is	  mentioned,	  the	  overall	  respondent	  pool	  shows	  less	  support	  for	  hosting	  the	  World	  Cup	  or	  Olympics:	  the	  percentage	  that	  thinks	  the	  games	  are	  a	  good	  thing	  drops	  from	  38.2	  to	  17.8	  overall.	  When	  considering	  the	  price	  tag,	  support	  continues	  to	  peak	  among	  women,	  residents	  of	  Recife,	  the	  upper	  middle	  class,	  and	  those	  with	  Masters	  or	  PhD	  degrees.	  The	  most	  opposed	  groups	  are	  younger	  adults,	  the	  lower	  middle	  class,	  college	  graduates,	  and	  residents	  of	  Rio	  de	  Janeiro.	  (Table	  3).	  
Table	  3:	  Is	  hosting	  a	  good	  thing,	  bad	  thing,	  or	  neither?	  Before	  and	  after	  mentioning	  cost	  
	  	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Before	  cost	  is	  mentioned	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  After	  cost	  is	  mentioned	   	  	  















thing	  Gender	   Male	  (45)	   31.1	   48.9	   20.0	   13.3	   68.9	   17.8	  Female	  (49,	  48)	   38.8	   55.1	   6.1	   16.7	   79.2	   4.2	  Age	   18-­‐29	  (48,	  47)	   37.5	   47.9	   14.6	   14.9	   74.5	   10.6	  30-­‐44	  (31)	   25.8	   64.5	   9.7	   12.9	   80.7	   6.5	  45-­‐59	  (13)	   38.5	   46.2	   15.4	   15.4	   61.5	   23.1	  60+	  (2)	   100	   0	   0	   50	   50	   0	  Social	  class	   A	  (21,	  20)	   33.3	   52.4	   14.3	   10.0	   70.0	   20.0	  B	  (42)	   38.1	   50.0	   11.9	   19.1	   69.1	   11.9	  C	  (23)	   21.7	   69.6	   8.7	   13.0	   87.0	   0	  D	  (3)	   66.7	   0	   33.3	   0	   66.7	   33.3	  Education	   Masters/PhD	  (27)	   37.0	   48.2	   14.8	   22.2	   66.7	   11.1	  Tertiary	  (58)	   34.5	   55.2	   10.3	   13.8	   77.6	   8.6	  Secondary	  (5,	  4)	   20.0	   40.0	   40.0	   0	   75.0	   25.0	  Primary	  (1)	   0	   100	   0	   0	   100	   0	  Location	   Belém	  (7)	   28.6	   57.1	   14.29	   0	   100.0	   0	  Recife	  (18)	   44.4	   33.3	   22.2	   22.2	   61.1	   16.7	  Rio	  de	  Janeiro	  (12)	   41.7	   58.3	   0	   16.7	   83.3	   0	  São	  Paulo	  (29)	   31.0	   55.2	   13.8	   10.3	   75.9	   13.8	  
Average	   38.2	   50.0	   11.8	   17.8	   72.3	   10.0	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Though	  support	  dropped	  or	  stayed	  the	  same	  among	  each	  demographic	  group	  when	  costs	  were	  mentioned,	  some	  groups	  revised	  their	  responses	  more	  in	  light	  of	  the	  information.	  When	  the	  games’	  cost	  is	  mentioned,	  those	  who	  think	  the	  games	  are	  a	  bad	  thing	  rises	  to	  72.3%	  overall—an	  increase	  of	  22.3	  points.	  Young	  adults	  are	  especially	  sensitive	  to	  the	  news,	  revoking	  their	  support	  by	  22.6%	  and	  increasing	  their	  negative	  views	  by	  26.6%,	  perhaps	  because	  they	  are	  most	  outraged	  at	  the	  spending	  while	  public	  education	  remains	  substandard.	  Adults	  ages	  30-­‐59	  respond	  least	  to	  the	  costs,	  along	  with	  the	  upper	  and	  middle	  classes	  and	  those	  who	  hold	  Masters	  or	  PhD	  degrees.	  	  	   Another	  determinant	  of	  sensitivity	  to	  the	  cost	  of	  hosting	  may	  be	  whether	  or	  not	  one	  appreciates	  the	  sports	  that	  will	  be	  on	  display.	  Before	  mentioning	  cost,	  net	  support	  for	  the	  World	  Cup	  or	  Olympics	  (replying	  that	  it	  is	  a	  somewhat	  or	  very	  good	  thing)	  is	  34.8%	  among	  non-­‐sports	  fans	  and	  41.1%	  among	  fans.	  When	  costs	  are	  mentioned,	  support	  drops	  among	  both	  groups,	  but	  more	  for	  non-­‐sports	  fans	  (21.7	  point	  decrease)	  than	  for	  fans	  (19.3	  point	  decrease).	  While	  the	  p-­‐value	  on	  the	  ChiSquare	  test	  for	  this	  comparison	  is	  too	  large	  (0.33)	  to	  claim	  statistical	  significance,	  there	  is	  a	  noticeable	  difference.	  Sports	  fans	  in	  this	  sample	  are	  more	  apt	  to	  believe	  these	  events	  are	  overall	  a	  good	  thing	  for	  Brazil,	  and	  while	  they	  are	  concerned	  about	  Brazil’s	  spending	  to	  host	  them,	  the	  costs	  do	  not	  incite	  their	  opposition	  as	  much	  as	  they	  do	  for	  non-­‐sports	  fans	  (Figure	  8).	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Figure	  8:	  Comparison	  of	  support	  for	  hosting	  between	  fans	  and	  non-­‐fans,	  before	  and	  after	  cost	   	  
	   	   Before	  mention	  of	  cost	   	   	   After	  mention	  of	  cost	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  Sensitivity	  to	  supporting	  the	  events	  also	  relates	  to	  how	  much	  one	  follows	  media	  coverage	  of	  the	  preparations.	  Before	  costs	  are	  factored	  in,	  54.2%	  of	  lower	  media-­‐consumption	  respondents	  express	  low	  support	  for	  the	  games,	  while	  37.1%	  support	  them.	  Opposition	  is	  slightly	  lower	  among	  the	  higher	  media-­‐consumption	  group,	  at	  47.8%,	  but	  support	  is	  about	  the	  same	  at	  38.8%.	  The	  lower	  media-­‐consumption	  group	  experiences	  that	  change	  of	  heart	  more	  than	  the	  higher	  group:	  disapproval	  rises	  31.5%	  in	  the	  lower	  group	  when	  considering	  costs,	  but	  only	  17.3%	  among	  the	  higher	  group.	  None	  of	  these	  results	  is	  statistically	  significant,	  but	  the	  discrepancies	  might	  suggest	  that	  the	  lower-­‐media	  consumption	  groups	  learn	  the	  costs	  of	  hosting	  these	  games	  for	  the	  first	  time,	  prompting	  them	  to	  reconsider	  their	  support,	  whereas	  higher-­‐media	  consumption	  individuals	  are	  more	  aware	  of	  the	  costs	  to	  begin	  with	  and	  therefore	  less	  swayed	  by	  their	  mention.	  Whereas	  members	  of	  the	  highest	  income	  level	  (Class	  A)	  have	  the	  largest	  proportion	  of	  respondents	  who	  follow	  news	  about	  the	  events	  a	  great	  deal	  (33.3%),	  the	  sample	  does	  not	  contain	  enough	  lower-­‐class	  individuals	  to	  determine	  whether	  there	  is	  a	  connection	  between	  income	  level	  and	  following	  these	  events.	  In	  any	  case,	  the	  fact	  that	  less-­‐informed	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respondents	  disapprove	  of	  the	  events	  more	  strongly	  when	  they	  heard	  the	  cost	  estimates	  suggests	  that	  the	  government	  and	  event	  organizers	  might	  deliberately	  neglect	  to	  inform	  the	  public	  about	  the	  expenditures;	  perhaps	  they	  understand	  that	  transparency	  about	  costs	  will	  lose	  them	  support	  for	  hosting.	  	  When	  asked	  how	  much	  they	  believed	  certain	  groups	  benefit	  from	  Brazil	  hosting	  the	  World	  Cup	  or	  Olympics,	  the	  perception	  of	  mega-­‐events	  as	  a	  business	  venture	  shines	  through.	  80%	  say	  local	  businesses	  benefit	  a	  good	  or	  great	  deal,	  while	  75%	  say	  local	  contractors	  in	  construction	  benefit	  that	  much	  and	  55%	  say	  the	  same	  for	  private	  real	  estate	  developers.	  Respondents	  reply	  even	  more	  adamantly	  when	  asked	  how	  much	  they	  believe	  the	  sports	  organizations	  benefit	  from	  hosting	  the	  events:	  93%	  believe	  local	  sports	  interests	  (CBF	  or	  the	  Rio	  Organizing	  Committee)	  benefit	  a	  good	  or	  great	  deal,	  and	  84%	  believe	  that	  FIFA	  or	  the	  IOC	  benefit	  a	  lot	  from	  Brazil	  hosting	  these	  events.	  Reflecting	  common	  criticisms	  of	  Brazil’s	  corrupt	  political	  system,	  90%	  believe	  Brazilian	  politicians	  benefit	  a	  good	  or	  great	  deal.	  Interestingly	  but	  not	  surprisingly,	  ordinary	  citizens	  (“people	  like	  me”)	  rank	  as	  the	  lowest	  beneficiaries	  by	  far:	  49%	  report	  that	  they	  will	  not	  personally	  benefit	  at	  all;	  additionally,	  not	  a	  single	  respondent	  reports	  that	  ordinary	  citizens	  will	  benefit	  a	  great	  deal—unique	  among	  all	  the	  groups	  mentioned.	  Among	  those	  who	  do	  feel	  they	  would	  personally	  benefit	  at	  least	  somewhat	  from	  Brazil	  hosting	  the	  events,	  61.9%	  believe	  that	  the	  country	  is	  generally	  going	  in	  the	  right	  direction,	  compared	  with	  18.7%	  who	  do	  not	  believe	  they	  personally	  benefit	  from	  the	  games	  but	  agree	  that	  the	  country	  is	  on	  the	  correct	  path.	  This	  suggests	  that	  individuals	  perceive	  themselves	  to	  gain	  personally	  from	  the	  events—a	  sign	  of	  feeling	  included	  in	  a	  greater	  national	  project—only	  if	  they	  believe	  that	  the	  country’s	  advancement	  is	  positive.	  Figure	  9	  compares	  the	  perceived	  benefits	  by	  stakeholder	  group.	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Content	  analysis:	  public	  discourse	  in	  letters	  to	  the	  editor	  	  	   The	  letters	  to	  the	  editor	  published	  in	  Folha	  de	  S.	  Paulo	  similarly	  reveal	  low	  levels	  of	  support	  for	  hosting	  the	  World	  Cup	  and	  Olympics.	  Of	  the	  55	  relevant	  LTEs	  analyzed	  in	  this	  project,	  only	  12	  (22%)	  express	  resounding	  support	  for	  hosting	  either	  event.	  Table	  5	  shows	  the	  aggregated	  attitudes	  expressed	  in	  these	  LTEs,	  for	  the	  three	  time	  periods.	  In	  each	  window,	  critical	  opinions	  outnumber	  supportive	  ones—an	  overwhelming	  15	  out	  of	  17	  (88%)	  letters	  published	  around	  the	  Confederations	  Cup	  criticized	  hosting	  the	  events.	  While	  that	  window	  represents	  the	  most	  discontent	  toward	  mega-­‐events	  in	  the	  letters	  section,	  the	  tone	  was	  negative	  from	  the	  beginning:	  critical	  letters	  exceeded	  supportive	  ones	  six	  to	  four	  when	  the	  World	  Cup	  bid	  was	  awarded,	  and	  11	  to	  six	  for	  the	  Olympic	  bid.	  Though	  the	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criticism	  only	  became	  more	  severe,	  the	  supposedly	  resounding	  support	  seems	  to	  have	  been	  absent	  all	  along.	  	  
Table	  4:	  Attitudes	  toward	  mega-­‐events	  in	  Folha	  de	  S.	  Paulo’s	  letters	  to	  the	  editor	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  LTE	  opinions:	  #	  (%	  of	  total)	  
Event	   Event	  date	   Time	  frame	   #	  LTEs	   Supportive	   Critical	   Mixed	  Brazil	  announced	  as	  World	  Cup	  2014	  host	  
10/31/2007	   9/19/2007-­‐1/11/2008	   12	   4	  (33%)	   6	  (50%)	   2	  (17%)	  
Olympic	  bid	  awarded	  to	  Brazil	   10/2/2009	   8/8/2009-­‐11/13/2009	   26	   6	  (23%)	   11	  (42%)	   9	  (35%)	  FIFA	  Confederations	  Cup	  	   6/6/2013	  (first	  game)	   5/5/2013-­‐	  7/27/2013	   17	   2	  (12%)	   15	  (88%)	   0	  (0%)	  
Total	   	   9/19/2007-­‐	  7/27/2013	   55	   12	  (22%)	   32	  (58%)	   11	  (20%)	  
	   For	  the	  most	  part,	  the	  supportive	  LTEs	  echoed	  boosters’	  grandiose	  claims	  about	  enhancing	  Brazil’s	  international	  standing	  and	  promoting	  a	  culture	  of	  sport.	  Shortly	  after	  Rio	  won	  the	  Olympic	  bid,	  letter-­‐writer	  Sandra	  Orietta	  Beltrán	  Baeza	  wrote	  October	  6,	  2009:	  “Congratulations	  to	  Rio	  and	  the	  Brazilian	  government	  …	  for	  Brazil,	  this	  win	  demonstrates	  its	  great	  ability	  to	  lead	  and	  is	  further	  proof	  of	  Brazilian	  international	  prominence.”	  The	  language	  of	  national	  pride,	  bold	  leadership,	  and	  global	  standing	  match	  the	  government’s	  claims	  about	  the	  intangible	  benefits	  of	  hosting	  these	  events.	  Citizens	  like	  this	  letter-­‐writer	  expect	  strong	  non-­‐pecuniary	  benefits	  from	  the	  events.	  But	  again,	  these	  Brazilians	  seem	  to	  be	  in	  the	  minority	  of	  letter-­‐writers:	  just	  over	  a	  fifth	  of	  letters	  analyzed	  in	  this	  project	  expressed	  that	  they	  personally	  valued	  Brazil	  hosting	  the	  events.	  	  Positive	  views	  in	  the	  letters	  section	  were	  drowned	  out	  by	  the	  58%	  of	  LTEs	  that	  expressed	  criticism	  of	  hosting	  the	  events.	  Most	  of	  those	  arguments,	  which	  ranged	  from	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mild	  discontent	  to	  proposals	  to	  cancel	  the	  games,	  attacked	  the	  high	  cost	  of	  hosting	  and	  highlighted	  the	  absurdity	  of	  that	  spending	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  poverty	  and	  inadequate	  health	  services.	  Claudir	  Joseph	  Mandelli	  wrote	  on	  October	  31,	  2007:	  “I	  have	  nothing	  against	  sports	  events,	  but	  in	  my	  values	  scale,	  football	  is	  not	  that	  important.	  I’d	  like	  the	  priority	  to	  be	  on	  health,	  education	  and	  infrastructure	  …	  I	  don’t	  understand	  why	  …	  to	  health	  centers,	  schools,	  basic	  sanitation,	  the	  answer	  is	  ‘we	  have	  no	  money.’”	  Other	  letters,	  like	  that	  of	  Eni	  Maria	  Martin	  de	  Carvalho	  published	  October	  13,	  2009,	  adopted	  antagonistic	  tones:	  “The	  same	  white	  handkerchief	  that	  wiped	  the	  emotional	  tears	  of	  our	  president	  to	  learn	  that	  Rio	  de	  Janeiro	  was	  chosen	  to	  host	  the	  2016	  Olympics	  should	  now	  serve	  to	  contain	  tears	  of	  shame	  to	  see	  that	  Brazil	  remains	  in	  the	  75th	  place	  in	  the	  Human	  Development	  Index.”	  Still	  other	  letter-­‐writers	  protested	  that	  these	  events—especially	  the	  World	  Cup—would	  reinforce	  unhelpful	  stereotypes	  abroad	  about	  Brazilians	  as	  soccer-­‐obsessed,	  and	  in	  a	  way	  unserious,	  people.	  	  	   The	  9	  mixed	  arguments	  were	  classified	  as	  so	  because	  any	  support	  was	  tempered	  by	  significant	  reservations.	  Several	  writers,	  for	  example,	  maintained	  that	  the	  Olympics	  will	  be	  beneficial	  for	  Rio,	  but	  lamented	  that	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  country	  will	  pay	  the	  bill,	  and	  for	  little	  value	  elsewhere.	  For	  example,	  Luciano	  Walnut	  Marmontel	  wrote	  October	  6,	  2009:	  “The	  victory	  of	  Rio	  to	  host	  the	  2016	  Olympic	  Games	  may	  be	  good	  news	  for	  Rio	  residents,	  who	  will	  once	  again	  receive	  hefty	  public	  investments.	  But	  I	  doubt	  that	  the	  rest	  of	  Brazil,	  which	  will	  have	  to	  bankroll	  the	  party,	  will	  gain	  anything	  with	  all	  this.”	  Other	  conflicted	  letter-­‐writers	  praised	  the	  improvements	  that	  have	  accompanied	  the	  preparations,	  but	  lamented	  that	  large-­‐scale	  events	  were	  necessary	  to	  prompt	  those	  changes.	  December	  2,	  2007,	  Luiz	  Antonio	  Pereira	  de	  Souza	  wrote:	  “In	  the	  country	  of	  football,	  [a	  World	  Cup	  is	  necessary	  so	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that]	  our	  authorities	  take	  some	  action	  related	  to	  the	  precarious	  conditions	  of	  our	  sporting	  infrastructure,	  especially	  our	  football	  stadiums.	  What	  country	  is	  this?”	  The	  writer	  expressed	  more	  interest	  in	  the	  sports	  themselves	  than	  critical	  letter-­‐writers,	  but	  his	  views	  do	  not	  constitute	  true	  support	  for	  hosting.	  	  















Section	  7:	  Conclusions	  and	  recommendations	  
	   My	  analysis	  has	  shown	  that	  hosting	  the	  World	  Cup	  and	  Olympics	  is	  unlikely	  to	  provide	  Brazil	  with	  an	  economic	  boost	  or	  a	  useful	  infrastructural	  impetus,	  and	  the	  events	  fail	  to	  sway	  Brazilian	  citizens	  as	  tools	  of	  public	  propaganda.	  My	  survey	  results	  demonstrate	  that	  while	  Brazilians	  do	  not	  strongly	  oppose	  hosting	  these	  events,	  they	  also	  perceive	  only	  minimal	  positive	  value—far	  from	  the	  resounding	  popular	  mandate	  that	  boosters	  claim	  to	  possess	  when	  they	  lobby	  to	  bid	  for	  such	  events.	  The	  abysmal	  state	  of	  Brazil’s	  social	  services	  put	  citizens’	  indifference	  into	  perspective:	  their	  apathy	  turns	  to	  aggravation	  when	  confronted	  with	  the	  opportunity	  cost	  of	  hosting	  these	  events.	  A	  content	  analysis	  of	  letters	  to	  the	  editor	  also	  revealed	  outrage	  that	  the	  government	  spends	  on	  mega-­‐events	  while	  neglecting	  essential	  social	  services.	  Part	  of	  this	  frustration	  may	  stem	  from	  a	  sense	  that	  even	  if	  the	  events	  will	  bring	  some	  benefits,	  ordinary	  Brazilians	  will	  not	  be	  the	  ones	  to	  reap	  them.	  Though	  Brazilians	  danced	  on	  the	  streets	  when	  the	  successful	  bids	  were	  announced,	  cheer	  soon	  gave	  way	  to	  disappointment.	  Boosters	  may	  claim	  that	  hosting	  mega-­‐events	  is	  hard	  medicine	  to	  swallow,	  but	  necessary	  for	  improving	  Brazil’s	  international	  image.	  Yet	  hosting	  events	  may	  have	  the	  reverse	  effect:	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  imagine	  how	  Brazil	  can	  mask	  its	  own	  citizens’	  dissatisfaction	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  approval	  abroad.	  	  Rather	  than	  explain	  why	  Brazil	  wanted	  to	  host	  these	  events,	  the	  negative	  forecast	  and	  local	  suspicion	  raises	  new	  questions	  for	  scholars	  to	  address.	  We	  must	  ask	  how	  the	  powers-­‐that-­‐be	  in	  the	  Brazilian	  political	  sphere	  and	  international	  sporting	  organizations	  have	  managed	  to	  secure	  enormous	  public	  subsidies	  for	  projects	  whose	  public	  support	  they	  never	  had	  to	  prove—most	  likely	  because	  they	  could	  not	  have	  done	  so.	  Such	  opacity	  seems	  unthinkable	  in	  an	  age	  when	  transparency	  is	  seen	  as	  a	  prerequisite	  to	  participating	  in	  the	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global	  economy	  and	  social	  media	  demands	  greater	  government	  accountability.	  These	  questions	  have	  bearings	  not	  only	  to	  ensure	  that	  Brazil	  manages	  its	  upcoming	  mega-­‐events	  responsibly	  and	  with	  consideration	  for	  the	  long-­‐term	  public	  interest,	  but	  also	  for	  future	  sporting	  events	  around	  the	  world.	  The	  lessons	  of	  local	  discontent	  and	  languishing	  promises	  should	  prove	  to	  future	  hosts	  that	  mega-­‐events	  are	  a	  powerful,	  double-­‐edged	  sword	  rather	  than	  a	  surefire	  panacea	  and	  marketing	  tool.	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Appendix	  A:	  Questionnaire	  
	  
(Note:	  this	  format	  aggregates	  questions	  asked	  on	  separate	  World	  Cup	  and	  Olympics	  surveys)	  	  1) Would	  you	  like	  to	  take	  this	  survey	  in	  English	  or	  Portuguese?	  	   English	   	   Portuguese	  	  2)	  Are	  you	  Brazilian,	  or	  not?	  	  	   Yes	   	   	   No	  	  3)	  Generally	  speaking,	  do	  you	  feel	  that	  things	  in	  Brazil	  are	  going	  in	  the	  right	  direction,	  or	  do	  you	  feel	  things	  have	  gotten	  pretty	  seriously	  off	  on	  the	  wrong	  track?	  	  	   Right	  direction	   	   Wrong	  track	  	  4)	  Do	  you	  consider	  yourself	  a	  soccer	  /	  sports	  fan,	  or	  not?	  	  	   Yes	   	   	   No	  	  5)	  Have	  you	  followed	  the	  news	  about	  Brazil	  /	  Rio	  de	  Janeiro	  hosting	  the	  2014	  FIFA	  World	  Cup	  /	  2016	  Summer	  Olympics?	  If	  so,	  how	  much	  have	  you	  paid	  attention	  to	  it?	  	  	   Not	  at	  all	   Very	  little	   Just	  some	   A	  good	  amount	   A	  great	  deal	  	  6)	  Overall,	  do	  you	  think	  hosting	  the	  World	  Cup	  /	  Olympics	  is	  a	  good	  or	  bad	  thing	  for	  Brazil,	  and	  to	  what	  extent?	  	  	   Very	  good	  thing	   	   Neither	  good	  nor	  bad	  thing	   	   Very	  bad	  thing	  	   Somewhat	  good	  thing	   	   	   	   	   	   Somewhat	  bad	  thing	  	   	  7)	  Experts	  project	  that	  the	  World	  Cup	  /	  Olympics	  will	  cost	  about	  R$	  6.7	  billion	  /	  R$	  7.2	  billion	  plus	  R$23.2	  billion	  in	  infrastructure,	  all	  largely	  funded	  by	  Brazilian	  taxpayers.	  Now	  considering	  those	  costs,	  do	  you	  think	  it	  is	  a	  good	  or	  bad	  thing	  for	  Brazil	  to	  host	  them,	  and	  to	  what	  extent?	  	  	   Very	  good	  thing	   	   	   Neither	  good	  nor	  bad	   Very	  bad	  thing	  	   Somewhat	  good	  thing	   	   	   	   	   	   Somewhat	  bad	  thing	  	  8)	  Do	  you	  think	  the	  World	  Cup	  /	  Olympics	  will	  showcase	  the	  best	  aspects	  of	  Brazilian	  society,	  reveal	  its	  worst	  parts,	  do	  neither,	  or	  do	  both?	  	  	   Showcase	  best	  aspects	   	   Reveal	  worst	  parts	   	   Neither	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   Both	  	  9)	  Try	  to	  think	  ahead	  to	  a	  few	  years	  after	  Rio	  hosts	  the	  Olympics	  /	  Brazil	  hosts	  the	  World	  Cup	  (say,	  2018	  /	  2020	  and	  beyond).	  Will	  Brazil	  be	  better	  or	  worse	  off	  from	  having	  hosted	  it,	  or	  will	  it	  have	  made	  no	  difference	  either	  way?	  	  	   Better	  off	   	   Worse	  off	   	   No	  difference	  	  10)	  Were	  you	  satisfied	  or	  unsatisfied	  with	  how	  Brazil	  hosted	  the	  FIFA	  Confederations	  Cup?9	  	  	   Satisfied	   	   Unsatisfied	   	   No	  opinion	  	  11)	  For	  each	  group	  I	  name,	  please	  indicate	  how	  much	  you	  believe	  they	  benefit	  from	  Brazil	  hosting	  the	  World	  Cup	  Olympics:	  	  	   Don’t	  benefit	   Benefit	  very	  little	   Benefit	  somewhat	   Benefit	  a	  good	  amount	   Benefit	  a	  great	  deal	  People	  like	  me	  –	  ordinary	  citizens	   	   	   	   	   	  Local	  businesses	  in	  the	  tourism	  sector	  (ie.	  hotels	  and	  restaurants)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   	   	   	   	  
Private	  real	  estate	  developers	   	   	   	   	   	  Local	  contractors	  in	  the	  construction	  industry	   	   	   	   	   	  Brazilian	  politicians	   	   	   	   	   	  Foreigners	   	   	   	   	   	  Rio	  2016	  Olympic	  Organizing	  Committee	   	   	   	   	   	  The	  International	  Olympic	  Committee	   	   	   	   	   	  Confederação	  Brasileira	  de	  Futebol	  (CBF)	  	   	   	   	   	   	  FIFA	   	   	   	   	   	  Other	  ___________________________	   	   	   	   	   	  	   	  12)	  Have	  you	  had	  the	  opportunity	  to	  publically	  voice	  your	  opinions	  on	  the	  World	  Cup	  /	  Olympics,	  or	  not?	  For	  example,	  did	  a	  political	  representative	  ask	  for	  your	  input,	  did	  you	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Asked	  only	  in	  World	  Cup	  Survey	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have	  the	  opportunity	  to	  attend	  a	  community	  meeting	  on	  the	  matter,	  or	  did	  officials	  contact	  you	  to	  ask	  what	  you	  think?	  If	  so,	  what	  did	  they	  ask?	  	   [	  	  	  ]	  Yes,	  have	  had	  opportunity	  	   	   	  
• If	  yes,	  please	  explain	  (what	  was	  the	  event,	  who	  hosted	  it,	  what	  were	  you	  asked?)	  	  	  ________________________________________________________________	  	  	  ________________________________________________________________	  	  	  ________________________________________________________________	  	  	   [	  	  	  ]	  No,	  have	  not	  had	  this	  opportunity	  	  13)	  Suppose	  that	  shortly	  before	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  World	  Cup	  finals	  /	  Olympic	  closing	  ceremonies,	  severe	  doubts	  on	  security	  issues	  with	  regard	  to	  stadium	  construction	  and	  potential	  criminal	  activity	  are	  raised.	  Therefore,	  FIFA	  /	  the	  International	  Organizing	  Committee	  wants	  to	  relocate	  the	  closing	  ceremony	  /	  cup	  finals	  to	  a	  city	  in	  another	  country	  with	  better	  infrastructure	  that	  is	  more	  prepared	  to	  stage	  the	  matches.	  There	  is	  still	  a	  chance	  that	  the	  tournament	  will	  take	  place	  in	  Brazil	  /	  Rio	  de	  Janeiro,	  but	  only	  if	  a	  series	  of	  costly	  safety	  measures	  are	  adopted.	  However,	  these	  previously	  unplanned	  measures	  can	  only	  be	  financed	  with	  immediate	  voluntary	  contributions	  from	  the	  population.	  Would	  you	  personally	  be	  willing	  to	  contribute	  some	  of	  your	  own	  money	  to	  ensure	  the	  finals	  can	  be	  hosted	  in	  your	  home	  country?	  If	  so,	  how	  much	  would	  you	  give?	  Note	  that	  Brazil	  /	  Rio	  cannot	  host	  the	  event	  if	  you	  contribute	  nothing.	  	  	   Would	  not	  contribute	   	   Would	  contribute	  R$	  _____	  	  14)	  Which	  possible	  outcomes	  of	  the	  World	  Cup	  /	  Olympics	  would	  you	  like	  to	  see	  the	  most?	  Examples	  include	  transportation	  projects,	  jobs,	  better	  roads	  and	  airports,	  or	  a	  better	  perception	  of	  Brazil	  internationally.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15)	  Which	  would	  you	  like	  the	  Brazilian	  government	  to	  focus	  on	  right	  now:	  World	  Cup	  /	  Olympic-­‐related	  projects	  like	  the	  one(s)	  you	  mentioned	  in	  your	  previous	  answer,	  or	  social	  services	  (such	  as	  improving	  health	  and	  education)?	  	   	   World	  Cup	  /	  Olympic-­‐related	  projects	   	   Social	  services	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16)	  What	  is	  your	  gender?	  	   Male	   	   Female	   Prefer	  not	  to	  say	  	  17)	  What	  is	  your	  age	  group?	  	  	   0-­‐17	   	   18-­‐29	   	   30-­‐44	   	   45-­‐59	   	   65+	   	  	  	  	  	  Prefer	  not	  to	  say	  	  18)	  What	  is	  your	  Brazilian	  social	  class?	  	   	  	   Class	  A	   	   Class	  C	  	   Class	  E	  	   Prefer	  not	  to	  say	  	   	   	  	   Class	  B	   	   Class	  D	  	  19)	  What	  is	  the	  highest	  level	  of	  education	  you	  have	  attained?	  	  	   Primary	   	   Tertiary	  	  	   Secondary	   	   Masters	  /	  PhD	  	  20)	  Which	  city	  in	  Brazil	  are	  you	  from?	  
